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Foreword 
It is a great pleasure for the Naval War College to publish Admiral J. Paul 
Reason's Sailing New Seas as the thirteenth in our series of Newport Papers. The 
purpose of this series, now in its eighth year, is to bring significant topics of 
national and maritime interest to the attention of a select group of readers. 
This Newport paper presents the ideas of one of the Navy's most senior lead­
ers. Admiral Reason's topic is the course the United States Navy should steer in 
the "typhoon of change" characterizing today's and tomorrow's world. He 
begins by describing what the technological, managerial, and social hurricane of 
the Information Age means for warriors who go to sea. He then addresses, in 
general terms and in specifics, the response such an upheaval requires. While ac­
knowledging the traditions that made the Navy great, Admiral Reason proposes 
a new way to think about the fleet as a whole, one that discards the "industrial 
age model" in favor of the "flight deck paradigm" of a high-performance 
organization operating at the edge of chaos. He concludes by stressing the im­
portance of rapid adaptability to the Navy's paramount measure of perform­
ance-warfighting. 
This is an insightful blending of the implications of the "trans-industrial age" 
to future warfare, the criticality of data, the relevance of an extraordinary naval 
model of leadership, and the requirement for a new mind-set in the United 
States Navy. It is a brief essay, because the author recognizes that quickness and 
individual initiative are far more important than "top-down direction" and "the 
voice of experience" in readying today's Navy for tomorrow's challenges. "The 
task at hand," he writes, "is to lever the Navy from the Industrial Age to the 
trans-industrial age, using data-based arguments to increase the efficiency and 
quickness with which it accomplishes its missions." 
I invite the reader to embark with Admiral Reason for a high-speed sortie 
into the future. 
Robert S. Wood 
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies 

Preface 
We in the Navy of the United States are anchored in the strong holding 
ground of our successful past, yet already we feel and see the leading indicators of 
a storm that threatens to wreck us at our hard-won anchorage. We face not a 
small squall and some temporary discomfort, but a typhoon more ominous than 
any we have encountered since 1944. This time it is a typhoon of change. Now is 
not the moment for backward-looking nostalgia, timid inaction, nervous knee­
jerk reactions , or mere hope. We must weigh anchor, pick the right course, and 
do all the difficult things necessary to sail onward at best speed, within the 
typhoon, through new and uncharted seas. 
America is the land of opportunity and transformation-it thrives on both. 
Naturally, American Sailors are used to change and excel at it. The Naval Serv­
ices led the way in steam, ironclads, carrier aviation,  amphibious warfare,  nuclear 
power, and sea-based missiles. To preserve our naval preeminence,  we must con­
tinue to be at the forefront of innovation and adaptation. 
The purpose of this Newport Paper is to stimulate thinking, discussion, and 
new approaches within the Navy. It is meant to be a primer for every Sailor of 
new seas. Not an academic work, it is more firmly rooted in my own observa­
tions and pe rceptions than in the scholarly work of others. Some of the unusual 
conclusions presented here grew out of wide-ranging and spirited discussions 
held among the leaders of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in the spring and sum­
mer of 1997. 
Welcome aboard. 
Make all preparations for getting underway. 
Rig for high winds and heavy seas. 
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The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy 
present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we 
must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must 
think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and 
then we shall save our country. 
- Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to 
Congress, December 1, 1862 
If we first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we 
could then better judge what to do, and how to do it. 
- Abraham Lincoln, Republican State 
ConlJention, Springfield, Illinois, 
June 16,1858 

Part One 
... where we are, and whither we are tending ... 

A Time of Change 
� are faced with something new and profoundly different .... The world is chang­
ing in ways both fundamental andJrom our perspective, almost incomprehensible. 
-William R. Brody, President,Johns Hopkins University 
E
MINENT SCHOLARS AND FUTURISTS hold that the entire world, par­
ticularly the United States, is in an era of rapid and radical change, pro­
found and thoroughgoing change that has never before been quite so rapid and 
radical as it is now. Take a good look around: sober reflection indicates that the 
prophets of change are right. 
Many of these pundits see the previous transition from agricultural to indus­
trial societies as a slow-motion example of what the world is currently going 
through. The development of the Industrial Age started very slowly, accelerated 
to a rapid pace during the nineteenth century, then eased to a more measured 
pace in the twentieth century. Now another transition is taking place as the 
world hastens from an industrial to a trans- or post-industrial era, known popu­
larly as the "Information Age." The present shift began slowly, but is moving 
quickly today, far more quickly than the former transition. 
Our intellects and our institutions (e.g., schools, churches, businesses, govern­
ments, armed services) have developed and matured in the late Industrial Age, 
the twentieth-century period of gradually increasing industrial complexity. We 
perceive the world around us through Industrial Age lenses. We think and speak 
in Industrial Age terms. We educate, organize, and govern ourselves on the basis 
of Industrial Age patterns. We fight with Industrial Age weapons in Industrial 
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Age ways. But now Industrial Age institutions, concepts, and terms are rapidly 
becoming or are already outmoded and irrelevant, while different organizations , 
ideas, and vocabularies are speedily developing to handle the realities of the new 
era. Like the movement from the agricultural era to the Industrial Age, but to a 
greater degree and at a faster rate, the trans-industrial
* 
period is transforming al­
most every area of human endeavor, including agriculture, industry, communi­
cations, commerce, government ... and war. 
This "jump-shift," this "radical bend," this "new age" is leading to wholly 
new ways of fighting (new ways of producing wealth lead to new ways of de­
stroying it). Warfare systems based on old ways and concepts can be outmaneu­
vered and neutralized by systems based on new ways and concepts. Bravery and 
speed and surprise will be just as important as they were at Trafalgar and Midway, 
but the weapons and tactics will be different. 
The urgent question is this: 
How is the mighty United States 
Navy, with its minds and organiza­
tions deeply rooted in the mature It!­
dustrial Age, to change quickly at!d 
tfficiet!tly into a Navy that Cat! fight 
and wit! it! a dpzamic, trans-industrial 
age? 
Aye, mates, there's the rub. 
Not only will the unimaginable happen, it 
will happen Jaster than you can imagine. 
Change comes hardest to those with the deep­
est traditions. 
-Mario Marino, founder of 
Legent Corporation. 
The Change Machine 
Incremental programmatic and organizational adjustments, more money, and 
improved Industrial Age weapon systems and platforms will not be enough to 
ensure that the U.S. Navy remains the preeminent navy. The usual responses (no 
matter how sophisticated) to variations in the late Industrial Age environment 
will not suffice, because the world has profoundly changed and is changing still. 
A new age calls for a new change machine. Metaphorically speaking , a fulcrum 
and lever, and the wisdom to use them effectively, are needed to move the Navy 
into the next era. (Should fulcrum and lever prove to be too slow, then powder 
and shot should not be spared.) 
* Many different terms are used to describe the "new age," such as "post-industrial age," "information age," 
"Third Wave," and "knowledge age." There are objections to each. This Paper seeks to avoid those 
objections by coining and using a new term, "trans-industrial age," which refers to an age in transition from 
the Industrial Age to something else. It is left to a future generation to find a more precise name for the present 
era of change. 
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The fulcr um consists of the mission and mission-related tasks. What must 
the Navy be able to do, and how swiftly ? In what environment, against what 
threats? What tasks must be accomplished to execute the mission in the time re­
quired? The Navy must answer those questions, then continually and rapidly update 
the answers. 
The lever is data. There was a time when enough resources were available to 
satisfY nearly every national military need and most national military desires. It 
used to be that service-specific arguments, decorated with soft numbers and 
buttressed by personal exper ience 
and well-ear ned reputation, car­
ried the day in budgetary debates. 
No longer. Now the Navy needs 
other, more cogent arguments, 
built upon hard, objectively meas­
ured, incontrovertible data. Credi­
ble, accurate data that is relevant to 
warfare missions and tasks consti-
Does it contain any abstract reasoning con­
cerning quantity or number? No. Does it con­
tain any experimental reasoning concerning 
matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it 
then to the flames: For it can contain nothing 
but sophistry and illusion. 
-David Hume, 18'" century 
tutes the lever with which the Navy can be moved into the new age. Indeed, 
such data is the only workable lever for the present and future world (see pages 
58-63).* 
Yet it is not enough simply to possess the tools for change. To use the lever 
and fulcrum cor rectly, wisdom is needed-wisdom which stems from a thor­
ough understanding of the Navy's missions, mission-related tasks, capabilities, 
and readiness.t From this wisdom must flow appropriate warfare concepts and 
theory. With this wisdom the Navy can deter mine what it requires to accom­
plish its missions quicker, better, and cheaper. Clearly, missions and mission­
related tasks, and the concepts for accomplishing them, must drive the require­
ments process.+ And, in tur n, defining the missions and tasks requires an under­
standing of the Navy's environment and the threats the Navy can expect in that 
environment. 
* By data is meant something more precise than what has usually been called "data"-namely, mere 
numbers generated by analyses of questionable relevance and rigor, supported by authoritative voices of 
experience. Data is real information, derived from accurate, verifiable measurements based on well-defined, 
meaningful standards. Numbers are fluff, orten prettily dressed up as "data." 
t Readiness again raises the issue of data. Evaluation of the Navy's readiness must be based on meaningful, 
consistently applied, quantifiable measures of effectiveness (see page 62). Current assessments of readiness are 
too often inadequate, inaccurate, misleading, or irrelevant. 
+ The other way around is illogical and foolish. 
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The Navy's Environment 
People often talk about shaping environments, but it is an inescapable fact that 
the technological environment shapes people and their societies (Karl Marx was 
right on that score).1 It is doing so today, probably faster and more thoroughly 
than even the most astute observers realize. Computer technology is trans­
for ming commerce, finance, social relations, and the armed ser vices, to name 
just a few, at an incredible pace. And the transformation is just beginning, 
steadily accelerating with no slowdown in sight. 
Infor mation can now be acquired with astonishing ease: an individual can ef­
fortlessly, cheaply, and quickly gather information that had previously been diffi­
cult to access, or had not been available at all. Information can also be distr ibuted 
and analyzed much faster than before, and it can be manipulated and used in 
ways never before imagined, to accomplish tasks not thought possible. The 
World W ide Web is a case in point. Growing at an exponential rate and evolving 
rapidly in complexity, the Web is remolding whole sectors of society: commerce, 
finance, communications, education-the list goes on. 
These new information capabilities catalyze the development and refinement 
of other capabilities, rendering older ones unnecessary or irrelevant. W ith regard 
to the Navy, the information technology explosion makes possible (list not ex­
haustive): 
• The manufacture of more precise and more lethal weapons, with a con­
sequent decrease in requirements for large amounts of on-hand ammu­
nition 
• The ability to incorporate into weapons hitherto unfathomable ad­
vances in maneuverability, speed, guidance, and range, thus alleviating 
the need to optimize those qualities in launching platforms 
• Decentralized, quicker, and better combat decision making through the 
use of data distribution systems, expert systems, and redundant commu­
nications 
• A diminished need for the Navy to have weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), together with the development of more effective defenses 
against the use of WMD by others 
• The distribution and dispersal of combat power, with attendant reduc­
tions in dependence on foreign bases and in the number of military as­
sets that are large, tempting targets for weapons of mass destruction 
• Dramatic reductions in warship manning 
• Improved efficiency in the generation and use of energy 
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All of the foregoing sounds wonderful; however, lest the Navy be dazzled by 
the promise of technology, certain caveats must be kept in mind to maintain 
clarity of vision. The technology sword cuts both ways: technology and infor­
mation are widely distributed and easily accessible, worldwide. With the increase 
in technological distribution and diversity, uncertainty likewise increases. The 
Navy must learn to deal with greater levels of tactical, operational, and strategic 
uncertainty. Furthermore, new technologies bring new vulnerabilities, usually 
unknown or unanticipated. The double-edged sword of information availability 
obliges the Navy to reexamine its plans and tactics continually in order to iden­
tify and then eliminate or minimize its vulnerabilities. Lastly, the increasing 
speed of change makes it necessary for the Navy to quicken its response cycle radi­
cally in all its activities and functions, else it runs the risk of being outmaneu­
vered, frustrated, and defeated. 
Developments in the technological environment are profoundly affecting the 
international environment. New technologies are altering the ways in which 
wealth is produced and distributed, which in turn is causing rapid (and poten­
tially dangerous) social, economic, and political change. International friction, 
fragmentation, shifting alliances, and new power relationships ensue. Economic 
competition is intensifying on a global scale, accompanied by the emergence of 
multinational companies having no firm commitments to any one nation and 
exerting considerable influence on world trade. 
Particularly relevant to the Navy is the growing vulnerability of free use of 
the seas. While growing more vital with increasing worldwide dependence on 
international trade, free navigation of the seas, already made vulnerable by cheap 
and low-technology weapons, is becoming even more vulnerable with the ap­
pearance of new and dispersed technology that enables the swift development of 
new weapons and ways of using them. 
For reasons related to the impacts of technology, the political complexion of 
the world changed radically in the 1980s. The history has been recounted be­
fore, but it bears review. The world in which most Americans matured was po­
larized by the United States and the Soviet Union . Dejure or defacto, most other 
countries aligned themselves with one superpower or the other, as their national 
interests dictated. The Soviet Union and the United States used cultural ties, 
economic ties, diplomacy, and raw power (more or less gently applied) to gain 
and retain the commitment of these countries. Friendly persuasion was usually 
used with those countries who were in positions affording some semblance of 
neutrality and who could play one pole against the other. 
That world no longer exists. The Soviet Union is gone and has not yet been 
replaced by a major power that has the ability and desire to compete with the 
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United States in a traditional (Industrial Age) military sense. American popular 
culture (not to be confused with values and mores) is spreading throughout the 
world and, aided by modern communications, is rapidly becoming the domi­
nant and pervasive world culture, even in countries whose leadership would 
strongly prefer otherwise. Most emerging and developing economies depend 
very much on access to the American market, relying on sales in that market to 
provide cash needed to fund modernization. For speedy development, often fa­
cilitated by ways to leapfrog expensive Industrial Age infrastructure, such econo­
mies also turn to technologies that are most highly advanced and available in the 
United States. 
In short, the Cold War situation, in which the United States needed the good 
will and cooperation of other nations more than they needed that of the United 
States, has been reversed. Over time, the United States will probably adjust its in­
ternational relationships accordingly. However, it is judicious to realize that the 
current situation is just as transient as the Cold War was-history confirms the 
impermanence of political arrangements. 
On the domestic front: although the people of the United States support a 
defense establishment sufficient for current needs, changes in relative economic 
strength and in domestic political and economic priorities may lead to erosion 
of support in the future. That handwriting is already on the wall and has been for 
many years . Rapid changes in technology, international politics, and interna­
tional economics will lead to much greater uncertainty (and political wrangling) 
in determining how best to provide for the national defense. Changing and 
widely varying social and educational standards, combined with economic de­
mands for trained and disciplined workers in the civilian workplace, will render 
it difficult for the armed forces of the United States to attract as many qualified 
people as they do now. 
The Threat 
This is not the place for a detailed listing of destabilizing forces in the world, 
but it is worth noting that rapid change frequently causes social, economic, and 
political instability. Instability is not a necessary consequence of rapid change, 
but it is a likely outcome. Traditional social structures, including family and re­
ligious structures, are often severely traumatized by sudden, swift change. The 
ensuing shock and aftershocks those structures undergo can be extremely stress­
ful for the members of any nation or organization. Extreme social stress leads of­
ten in turn to extreme (radical) behavior. In the current state of affairs, all states 
and organizations, however modern, are subject to the risk of change-induced 
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instability. Moreover, the international situation is becoming so fluid that any 
state or organization can become an ally, and any can become an enemy (or an 
unhelpful neutral). 
It would be dangerously imprudent for the military and political leaders of 
the United States to think that because American armed forces appear to be 
stronger than any others, they are also smarter than others are and have no criti­
cal vulnerabilities. Such arrogant opinion can become fatal delusion, for there 
are many asymmetric threats, and more are coming. Low-tech, self-sacrificial, 
asymmetric, unconventional (including but not limited to chemical and biologi­
cal weapons)-these adjectives describe the kinds of threats that U.S. forces are 
unaccustomed to countering. Dangerous already in themselves, such threats are 
actually more sinister because they are stealthy: they do not appear on late-In­
dustrial Age mental or institutional radar screens. As an institution, the Navy 
tends not to see these kinds of threats because they are hidden by ingrained para­
digms of cognition and thought. * 
It is unlikely that any hostile organization or state will challenge the U.S. Navy 
with aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, or amphibious task forces. That course 
would be foolishly playing to American strengths. Rather, it is far more likely that 
enemies will look for, find, and exploit vulnerabilities. Yet-and this may seem in­
tuitively obvious, but is worth stating plainly-U.S. forces are well prepared to 
counter expected threats, unprepared to counter unexpected or unimagined 
threats. Preparedness of that kind is not enough. The list of real threats which the 
next Navy and the Navy-after-next must be ready to meet should be expanded to 
include all those present and future threats for which today's Navy was not built. 
Weapons of mass destruction rank high on the list of threats to be addressed. 
Some WMD, such as nuclear weapons, can be developed only by advanced in­
dustrial economies; nonetheless, these WMD can still be wielded by anyone able 
to buy or steal them and move them to a target area (a difficult task, but not im­
possible). Other WMD do not require a highly evolved industrial base for their 
development, and they are relatively easy to transport. These include chemical 
and, especially, biological weapons. If the methods of their acquisition and em­
ployment are imaginative enough, weapons of mass destruction may constitute 
asymmetric threats, circumventing defenses devised against them. Moreover, al­
though WMD are reserved primarily for use against very expensive, massive, or 
massed targets,t they can also be used against discrete (point) targets. 
* The histories of medicine and physical science are replete with examples of how deeply rooted. 
authoritative patterns of thought concealed---and were later changed or discredited by-realities later 
confirmed by experiment. The histories of naval and land warfare are no different. 
t That is, targets inviting targeting by weapons of mass destruction. 
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One asymmetry difficult to account for is the non-state. The United States 
normally considers other states as potential enemies. However, given the wide 
distribution of technology and knowledge, and the capabilities of well-honed 
terrorist and smuggling organizations, future enemies may not be other states 
and nations . Troublesome questions then arise: How is the United States to 
counter non-state threats? Can a state declare war against a non-state? What if 
the non-state is sheltered within the territory of another state? The rise of so­
phisticated, powerful, and hostile non-states suggests that finding answers to 
these and related questions should become a paramount national priority. 
Adding further complexity to the issue of asymmetric threats is the changing 
status of the rules of war. Some parties seek new rules (e.g., the prohibition of 
land mines), others recognize no rules. New or newly radicalized states may not 
observe the rules of war, claiming that the old rules unfairly put them at a disad­
vantage or that the rules of war do not apply to them because their situation is 
unique and merits exception. That has happened many times in the twentieth 
century; it would be wise to expect it to occur in the twenty-first . Even more 
vexing is the fact that non-states are not parties to the Geneva Conventions nor 
are they members of the United Nations. Hence they usually do not regard 
international law or the rules of war as obligatory. 
The question is, What to do? What are the concepts for protecting the nation 
against the threats discussed above? What will the Navy's tactics be? No one 
knows. What will the Rules of Engagement be? No one knows. Do the United 
States and the other nations of the world need new rules? Probably, but even the 
U.S. in its leadership role has not given that matter adequate constructive 
thought. 
In a nutshell, the problem is unpredictability. The Navy and the nation must rec­
ognize and face the existence of exceedingly high, and rising, levels of uncer­
tainty. In the period from 1947 through 1990, the crystal ball was relatively clear; 
now it is distressingly cloudy. It is just not at all easy today to peer into the future 
and make reliable predictions. The litany of unknowns is daunting: 
• No one knows who the enemy will be. 
• No one knows if the enemy will be a state or an organization. 
• No one knows what weapons and technologies the enemy will have 
and how they will be used. 
• No one knows when the enemy will strike. 
• No one knows what the enemy's objectives will be. 
• No one knows what tactics the enemy will use. 
• No one knows what rules, if any, the enemy will observe. 
• No one knows which rules the Navy will be allowed to use. 
10 
No one knows. But inaction is not 
an option, especially for the Navy. 
Ways must be found to deal with 
chronic and extreme uncertainty; 
with the inability to predict anything 
in the long term; with radical, rapid, 
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Necessity is the mother of invention. 
-(Proverb) 
Necessity is a ferocious teacher. 
-Michel de Montaigne, 16" century 
pervasive change; and with much more limited budgets. It is necessary that this 
be done, and the sooner the better, for later is likely to be too late. 
The Response: Become Quicker, Cheaper, and Better 
The United States struggled for forty-five years to create a defense establishment that 
could 4fectively and efficiently prepare for and wage a conflict such as World J%r II 
or a possible global clash with the Soviets. Hopefully the Pentagon will not take as 
long to reorganize for the security challenges r.if the post- Cold J%r era, in which or­
ganizational adaptability and quickness are major assets. 
-Senator Sam Nunn 
A dynamic world requires a defense organization that can prepare quickly for a wide 
range of challenges. 
-Senator Sam Nunn 
The new strategic imperative is quickness. Survival of the fittest is now survival 
of the fleetest-Jack Tar be nimble,Jack Tar be quick. To become quicker, three 
things are required: flexibility, agility, and speed. 
Flexibility is the ability to respond to change. Maximizing flexibility demands 
distributed information, a decentralized decision structure, simple decision rules, 
and mission-based orders. The flight deck of an aircraft carrier is a perfect 
small-scale example of a flexible organization (see pages 22-25). Its crew is com­
posed of well-trained, sharply focused, mutually supporting personnel. It is a 
supple, highly responsive, flat organization. Information is widely distributed, 
and there are redundant methods of distribution. The flight deck operates on the 
basis of simple decision rules, with authority for action placed at action levels, 
dependent upon position, skill, and information rather than rank. 
Agility involves alertness, the ability to move swiftly and easily in any direc­
tion, and the capacity to change direction on short notice. The agile organiza­
tion is flat: it has no tall, vertical, thick-walled "stovepipes." The agile, flat, broadly 
dispersed organization is quick to aggregate whatever forces are needed for 
emergent missions. In such an organization, decision making is decentralized, 
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with decisions made quickly by the persons at the point of the spear-they have 
the most to gain or lose. Information is widely distributed and accessible , not 
tightly controlled and compartmented, with all necessary and relevant information 
(not all information, merely) passed in digestible form to decision makers at the 
cutting edge of mission execution. 
* 
As to speed, fighter pilots have it right: speed is life. The Navy must be able to 
move faster than any potential enemy, and not just in its fighter aircraft. It must 
be the fastest in developing and fielding new technology; in developing the tac­
tics that use new technology; and in developing measures to protect new vulner­
abilities. The Navy must be able to redirect its effort and direction much more 
rapidly than anyone else. The Navy's cycle times and combat decision time must 
be made so short that no one can turn within the Navy's wake-its information 
and decision loops must be too fast and tight to counter. Operational security 
must come primarily from speed of action (which includes speed of decision) 
rather than from information classification systems. 
The Navy must not only become quicker, it must also do things cheaper. The 
days of plenty are long gone, and yearning after them or trying to recover them is 
futile. Expanding entitlement expenditures, economic dislocations due to forces 
of change, increasing global competitiveness, and the absence of clear and pres­
ent danger will all serve to decrease the share of American resources allocated to 
defense. Certainly the Navy will save money by becoming quicker, for time is 
money (spent in salaries, fuel usage, wear and tear, inventory storage,lost oppor­
tunities, inefficient use of capital investment). One conspicuous imperative is the 
reduction of waste: wasted time, wasted talent, wasted people, wasted opportuni­
ties, wasted capital investments, and wasted fuel, parts, food, etc. A related task is 
the removal of unnecessary duplication in mission-tasking and organizational 
structure. 
Everything the Navy does must and can be done faster and cheaper-but not 
shoddily. Faster and cheaper do not necessarily imply worse, and the times de­
mand that the Navy do things better; quality of performance must improve, con­
tinuously. The Navy is justly proud of its ability to do things well. That is good . 
However, in naval technology and warfare the Navy has been so much better 
than its competitors that it expects the margin of excellence to continue. That is 
bad. Those who have been at sea on the ships of other excellent navies know 
that in some regards the preeminence of the u.s. Navy is already being chal­
lenged in quality though not (yet) in quantity. Given the worldwide free flow of 
information and rapid rates of technological and economic change, the Navy 
* The last two sentences of this paragraph identify the hallmarks ofUflat organization" in the context of this 
paper: namely, decentralized decision making and timely flow of relevant information. 
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cannot assume that it will remain the undisputed heavyweight naval champion. 
It must instead work constantly to stay in shape, learn new moves, and become 
quicker than all contenders. The Navy must keep its focus on the correct missions 
and on the ability to adapt and change. 
W hile the Navy grows quicker, cheaper, and better, it ought also to become 
more dispersed. Weapons of mass destruction are the ultimate Industrial Age 
weapons, and the Navy must be able to deal with them. One method of coun­
tering WMD is to eliminate or hide concentrations of wealth or power which 
would invite their attention. To that end, the effectiveness of WMD may be 
greatly reduced by segmenting and dispersing naval forces. Moder n technology 
facilitates that task and also enables the control and assembly ("mix-and-match") 
of dispersed forces and weaponry as the situation demands. 
§§§ 
A final thought: Homeports are indeed homes. Despite rumors to the con­
trary, the Navy and the other armed forces are not isolated societies. In fact, mili­
tary and civilian communities are becoming more closely intertwined, to the 
extent that dispersed units of the ar med forces take on the complexions of their 
host communities, in varying degrees. The armed forces need more effective 
representation in civilian communities to enhance the mutual benefits of close 
military-civilian relationships. The military is already relying very much on the 
material and human resources of civilian communities; increasingly it is drawing 
its ideas from them. 
Gone are the days when the military led civilian society in technology and 
organizational ability. The military now has more to learn than it has to teach. It 
can learn valuable lessons from successful American companies in many areas, 
including: 
• Rapid , timely, and economic worldwide distribution of material, infor-
mation, and services 
• Decentralized management of operations around the world 
• Customer service 
• Reliability of equipment 
• Advanced manufacturing techniques 
• Encouraging innovative leadership 
• Recruiting premium talent 
• Rapidly redirecting organizational focus 
• Foster ing organizational vigor 
• Networking and information management 
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• Supplier integration 
• Data collection and analysis 
• Food services 
• Dynamic incorporation of new and advanced technologies 
Many citizens in the civilian sector are ready, willing, and able to teach the 
Navy. T hey share the sentiment expressed by the director of human resources at 
Solar Turbines: "It's our Navy too, you know." 
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Part Two 
... what to do ... 

AN ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERIZED by rapid change and chronic, 
extreme levels of uncertainty is an environment on the edge of chaos. It is 
a great place to be in, because it is where the action is, where the opportunities 
are, and where the future will be defined. As discussed previously, such an envi­
ronment already surrounds the Navy. Responding to it effectively-i.e., becom­
ing quicker, cheaper, and better-requires consideration of: 
• The Navy's essential capabilities 
• Operational command and control 
• Management of the Navy as a whole 
• The Navy's force structure (ships, aircraft, and submarines) 
• Fleet organization (to be discussed in depth) 
• Warfare community representation and leadership 
The following sections discuss these matters in the sequence above. Although 
the sections may be read independently, it must be remembered that they are in­
terrelated 
Essential Navy Capabilities 
The most essential Navy capabilities are sea control, forward presence, and 
power projection. These capabilities are not new, but in the current climate of 
change their characteristics and relative priority must be reevaluated. 
Sea Control 
The American economy relies heavily on international trade. In fact, all the 
economies of the world, including those of the developing nations, and all 
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multinational companies depend for their prosperity upon uninterrupted 
worldwide commerce. World trade is vital and growing in importance; there is 
really no such thing as an isolated economy anymore. Although the interna­
tional economy increasingly includes electronic financial exchanges and traffic 
in knowledge labor, it still depends for the most part upon the exchange of raw 
mater ials, product components, and finished goods. That trade requires free use 
of the seas, currently guaranteed to the world by the United States Navy, cour­
tesy of the American taxpayer. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the U.S. Navy has become the 
dominant sea power. In the latter half of the century, the United States has, in a 
spirit of enlightened self-interest, willingly used its Navy to maintain the "free­
dom of the seas." Indeed, freedom of the seas has not been significantly chal­
lenged for over fifty year s only because of America's power and will to maintain 
it. All multinational corporations and peaceful nations have consequently en­
joyed free use of the seas for legitimate trade. Although they may assume that 
freedom of the seas will continue, it is only prudent for the U.S. Navy to assume 
that it will not-at least, not without challenge. Despite the recent historical rec­
ord, freedom of the seas can be challenged, and, in a dynamic and uncertain 
world rife with technological, political, economic, and social change, a challenge 
is inevitable. 
Freedom if the seas is the most important product if the United States Navy. It is the 
preeminent economic gift of the American people to the rest of the world. 
Without it, world trade and world economies collapse. 
Sea control is therefore the Junda-
mental capability oj the Navy. 
There is no forward presence on 
the sea without control of the 
sea. There is no power projec­
tion from the sea without con­
trol of the sea. There is no 
initiation or support of littoral 
warfare from the sea without 
control of the seas between the 
United States and the engaged 
littoral. Sea control is absolutely 
necessary, the thing without 
which all other naval missions, 
In fact, at the core of us. security require­
ments lies one prerequisite--sea control. Us. 
military strategy is based on forward presence 
and power projection--maintaining a pres­
ence in key regions and, when necessary, de­
ploying and sustaining sea, land, and air 
forces overseas. If we cannot command the seas 
and the airspace above them, we cannot proj­
ect power to command or influence events 
ashore; we cannot deter; we cannot shape the 
security environment. 
-Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval 
Operations 
and most national missions, precar iously r isk catastrophic failure. It is impos­
sible to overemphasize this point. 
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Forward Presence 
There are four methods of maintaining forward naval presence, and all four 
can be employed simultaneously: forward basing, deployment, cruising, and 
sprinting. Forward basing involves and is limited by political obligations and vul­
nerabilities. W here these are not too serious and present few impediments, for­
ward basing is a quite effective and efficient way to maintain presence. 
Deployment is the scheme the Navy has used since the 1950s. The u.s. Navy is 
well practiced at it-quite expert, really. However, deployment suffers from a se­
rious drawback: it is expensive in terms of time, consumption of capital naval in­
vestment (i.e., ships and aircraft), fuel, and outlays to fund current-year 
operations. 
Cru ising can be thought of as an "infesting the oceans" variation on the Ma­
rine Corps concept of "infesting the battlefield." The u.s. Navy cruised exten­
sively earlier in this century, even after World War II. Cruising is not practiced 
now, but with today's shipbuilding, weapons, and information technologies it is a 
feasible, easily implemented method. It may be perfectly appropriate to the 
"Navy-after-next." 
Cruising can use large numbers of relatively inexpensive, slow, simple, lightly 
manned, self-sufficient, high-endurance ships spread over the oceans in a broad 
network. Such ships can be armed with missiles (offensive and defensive) and 
carry combat troops, two helicopters, and inflatable boats. Notional cruises are 
about five months long, "round the world," with adequate liberty and "show the 
flag" port calls. Cruising units can be aggregated to whatever extent necessary to 
counter emergent threats. A network of cruising warships is readily expandable 
and can be the mobilization focus of the Naval Reserve. It can augment or be 
augmented by deployed or sprinting forces. 
Relatively junior personnel man the cruising ships, and they respond to mis­
sion exigencies in accordance with simple decision rules in which they are thor­
oughly drilled. Cascaded expert systems support the crews, utilizing both locally 
generated data and "demand-pulled" or "command-pushed" data from remote 
locations. 
Lastly, forward presence can also be achieved through sprinting--i.e., moving 
forces at high speed from bases in the United States to areas of crisis. Of the four 
methods of maintaining presence, sprinting has the least deterrent effect. To ex­
ert an early influence, U.S. forces must be visible in a region as, not after, political 
unrest begins to deteriorate towards crisis. Another drawback is that sprinting 
naval forces may frequently lack staying power; high-speed mobile forces can 
easily "outrun" their logistics "tail." Still, sprinting (or surging) is currently the 
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option usually exercised in the face of rapidly developing crises. In the absence 
of prearranged bilateral agreements, naval surges are attractive courses of action 
because of the self-sufficiency of afloat expeditionary forces. 
Power Projection 
Like the other services, the Navy has placed a premium on power projection 
since the beginning of the Cold War. The United States did not think that the 
Soviet Union had developed the capability to invade and occupy the American 
continent. However, the U.S. was very concerned that the Soviet Union would 
invade and occupy other countries. Also of concern was that the U.S.S.R. would use 
its massive strategic strike capability to neutralize the power of the United States. To 
deter Soviet military action against the U.S. and its allies, America developed a credi­
ble power projection capability able to be used against the Soviet Union. Since the 
U.S.S.R. was generally not considered to seriously threaten the ability of the United 
States to maintain freedom of the seas, the U.S. Navy emphasized power projection 
over sea control--sea control efforts were focused primarily on countering Soviet 
submarines. 
Now that the Soviet Union is defunct, it is time for the Navy to reconsider its 
power projection role, beginning with the obvious, fundamental question: "W hy 
must the Navy be able to project power?" In brief, the Navy requires the ability 
to project power in order to support three missions: 
• Sea control 
• The establishment of a foothold on foreign territory, thereby enabling 
the fullest projection of Army and Air Force power deeply and broadly 
against an enemy 
• Strategic operations and deterrence
· 
Paramount among these three missions is sea control (because it must precede 
the other two): controlling the seas to maintain free navigation by the United 
States and friendly countries and to deny the seas to countries hostile to the na­
tion or its friends. Sea control requires the will and capability to neutralize mili­
tary power that can challenge free use of the seas. Thus sea control entails the 
ability to project power: 
• Against forces on, in, or over the sea 
• Landward in sufficient depth against forces that may be brought to bear 
against seagoing commerce or naval forces. 
• The Navy provides ballistic missile submarines and trained crews to STRATCOM, which plans and 
directs deterrent patrols and strategic operations. 
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Littoral warfare is especially relevant to the first two of the three supported 
missions-controlling the seas and gaining footholds on foreign te rritory. To 
dominate the battle spaces related to these missions,  the Navy and Marine Corps 
must be able to: 
• Counter hostile forces brought to bear against the battle spaces 
• Isolate and interdict the battle spaces as necessary until the power pro­
vided by the other services can be applied 
• Supplement the isolation and interdic tion efforts of the other services 
once they are established in  theater. 
Command and Control 
Responsive command and con trol is an essential part of sea c ontrol , for­
ward p resence ,  and p ower p roj e c ti o n .  That seems obvious ,  but  the key wo rd 
is responsive. By that criterio n ,  I n dustrial Age systems of highly structu re d  and 
cen tralize d  command and control are inadequate at the e dge of chaos .  T h ey 
are too slow, too vulnerable,  insufficie ntly agile,  and unable to collect  and 
p rocess all the relevant information they need .  T h e  evolving environment  re ­
quires decentralized command supported by timely flows of relevant infor­
matio n .
· 
Mission co mmanders must thoroughly understand mission 
obj e c tive s and must sharply fo cus o n  miss ion executio n .  T h ey must be sup­
p o rted with pe rtinent informa tion provided fro m  all sources via redunda n t  
delivery systems .  Two simple examples of this mode of operating a t  the e dge 
of chaos are the use of wire -fre e co mmunications to support damage con trol 
efforts and the simultaneous use  of multiple , inte rconne c te d  (aurally and 
visually) observe rs and actio n personnel on the fligh t deck of an airc raft car­
rier (see next section ) .  
Mission commanders ought to be equippe d with cascaded expert systems 
that feed decision nodes by: 1) consolidating externally received information 
with organic input; 2) reducing information to digestible amounts in readily un­
derstandable fo rmats . Furthermore, mission commanders should be provided 
with, and trained in, the use of simple decision rules .  They can then apply the 
rules to consolidated information and act accordingly. 
Now, suppose a large-scale version of this decentralized system of command 
and control is also the way to run the entire Navy in the future . . . .  
• That is, the evolving environment requires an agile , flat orga nization (see pages 1 1- 1 2 ) .  
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Managing the Navy of the Future Using a Fl ight Deck Parad ig m 
In an article written several years ago, John Pfeiffer reports on the work of 
three professors (University of California, Berkeley) who studied "high­
reliability, complex organizations which, in the throes of adapting to fast­
changing times, manage to achieve remarkably low failure rates .
, ,2 Primary em­
phasis in the article is given to flight operations aboard a Navy aircraft carrier. 
Thus, some of what follows is familiar to naval professionals , but all of it merits 
close attention. 
In the complex and rapidly changing world of a carrier flight deck during 
flight operations, very complex procedures must be executed quickly and per­
fectly, or catastrophe results . Information for decision making comes in fast­
flowing floods. Scores of decisions and actions must occur nearly simultaneously 
and are often followed by torrents of more information and equally urgent deci­
sions that likewise allow no margin for uncorrected error. 
The flight deck is not unique. Rapid development of technology and ready 
availability of large amounts of time-sensitive information are causing many 
other organizations and activities (at least in their critical parts) to exhibit similar 
characteristics :  high speed; high tension and stress; extreme complexity; no toler­
ance of uncorrected error; operations at the edge of chaos. 
Information demands and flows are increasingly large and fast in all profes­
sions and businesses. Huge amounts of information (good and bad, and who 
knows which is which?) arrive constantly. Decisions must be made faster, and 
the impacts of those decisions develop faster. Such is life in the quickly moving 
and turbulent world. 
Vertical (Centralized) Management 
The old, Industrial Age organization (there are many such, and the current 
Navy organization is one of them) is unsuited to operations at the edge of chaos 
and is rapidly becoming obsolete. It  is composed of big wheels supported by 
staffs of experts; gradations of smaller wheels ; and cogs. * The standard organiza­
tion chart shows it well, although most of the cogs do not even show, and the ex­
perts-given little real power-are put into small boxes off to the side of the 
supported wheels . The Industrial Age organization's vertical decision structure, 
with its concentration of power at the top, cannot quickly digest the data and 
* Wheels and cogs are the tenus Pfeiffer uses in his article. 
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information provided it .  As a result, it responds too slowly, and too often inap­
propriately. By its very nature it is condemned to be inadequately efficient and 
effective in the evolving environment. 
In spite of this archaic structure 's inherent systemic deficiencies ,  many organi­
zations expend considerable effort, and legions of consultants earn a good living, 
trying to make it work in the new, modern world. Society educates more big 
wheels (and then pays them well) because it assumes (out of habit) that more big 
wheels can make the thing go. Does the old structure actually work? Ask the 
cogs . 
The Navy still uses that type of vertical organization for parades and pay, but 
should not use it for operations at the edge of disaster and chaos. The flight deck 
certainly does not use it .  Every person on the flight deck is an expert, doing one 
task (o r a few tasks) very well . The tasks are significant in the most extreme sense: 
if done well , people live; if done poorly, people die. Eve ry flight deck crew mem­
ber understands that complex, fast-moving, merciless environment, and knows 
that eve rybody on the flight deck is an expert. When speaking as an expert in a 
ce rtain area, a crew member-whether officer or seaman-is listened to, even 
deferred to. Experts demand to be heard, and are heard, because they are experts. 
Furthermore, any "cog" acting as an expert can shut down flight operations , and 
no officer (not eve n an admiral) will contest the right, obligation, and authority 
to do so. Such behavior is not punished; rather, it is supported, recognized, and 
rewarded. 
There is one important caveat to note : in all organizations " there tends to be a 
chronic gap between ' taskers,' who give orders , and ' operators ,' who must carry 
them out.") For the flight deck and organizations analogous  to it, the obvious 
conclusion is that taskers should not give operational orders . The key is to train 
the operators well and then tell them what to do, but not how to do it. (Actually, 
operators need more than good training and a clear mission order. They also 
need information, as discussed below. ) 
Flat (Decentralized) Management 
Many organizations facing e nvironments and situations similar to those on 
the flight deck have assessed requirements and possibilities differently. They see 
the new technology in information distribution and processing as an opportu­
nity to take more centralized (tighter) control of operations. They assume that 
with more information from operators in the field, obtained more quickly and 
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p rocessed in greater detail , decisions about execution ("how to do it") can be 
made, and made better, at a centralized command facility. 
That assumption is false. Take the flight deck :  not all the significant info rma­
tion regarding the "beat" of the flight deck can be communicated to a decision 
maker in the bowels of th e ship. Likewise,  the "beat" of the battlefield, in business 
or war, cannot be fully communicated to a decision ma ker-a "big wheel"-at 
a headquarters .  The smells , the tensions , the noises , the pulse, the fe el, the events 
unconsciously seen and recorded peripherally-all these cannot be verbalized or 
digitized , trans mitted, and reconstituted accurately, completely, and quickly 
enough . 
Experts must make some decisio ns on the scene (actually, many decisions,  in 
fast-breaking and dangerous situations) . However, no expert  can " know it all ." 
No expert can make sense of the turbul ent flow of events, in toto,just by looking 
at the whole operation-although every expert must have a ge neral understand­
ing of it .  Areas of expertise, responsibility, and authority must be kep t to a level to 
which the expert can be trained and within which the expert can be fully aware 
of all important,  relevant infor matio n .  In other wo rds , every exp ert must be fo­
cused o n  an asp ect of the chaotic environment small enough to be ordered and 
understandable;  and the organization mu st recognize each expert as the primary 
(and,  in some cases, absolute) authority within that area, regardless of rank. 
The organi zation mu st also acknowledge that even the best-trained human 
can make mistakes if give n defective or inadequate infor matio n ,  or if the ability 
to recognize and use information is impaired by exhaustion or overloading. 
Therefore, each expert must be supported to ensure that appropriate informa­
tion is received and p rocessed correctly. Providing p roper informa tion support 
to the exp ert sounds like an simple ma tter, but it is actually difficult. Co nsider: if 
the exp ert receives conflicting infor mation, which source sho uld be believed? If 
the expert receives more information tha n can be digested, what war rants im­
mediate attention? True,  information can be correlated and checked for quality 
before the exp ert receives it ,  but then it may arrive too late (actually, it i s likely to 
arrive too late) . 
The solution is to limit input to the expert to factual observations,  
and-where feasible-to have at least three paths for transmission to the expert .  
If multiple paths of transmission are not feasible, o r  if the input consists of ana­
lyzed info rmation, then the inp u t  sh ould be sent from one source.  If there is too 
much incoming information for the expert to digest ,  it should be sorted, par­
tially analyzed,  and then presented by supporting expert systems that can be p ro­
grammed and activated at will . 
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Flight  deck management is the epitome of decentralized management. It has five sali-
ent, essential properties :  
• Experts are trained to do certain tasks in the desi red way. 
• Experts are given full responsibility and authority to do those tasks . 
• Experts are provided the information they need. 
• Experts are depended upon to accomplish their tasks . 
• It is assumed that the experts have done their j obs unless they report 
that their j obs cannot be done, or have not been done .  
Learning from the Flight Deck 
The inescapable fact is that in times of rapid change, centralized management does not 
work well in a complex, technologically sophisticated society. Does the reader want con­
firmation? Ask the old Soviet Politburo. Ask a combat c ommander in a modern 
military force.  Ask the field or sales representatives of companies selling the 
produc ts of new and swiftly developing technologies .  And lastly, ask the cogs. 
It would be fitting to use more flight deck management throughout the Navy (and, in 
fact, throughout  the Department of Difense), because it is the management system most 
suited to command and control in combat or a t  the edge of chaos. Every com­
mander-and, indeed, every civilian manager-has wrestled wi th the question 
of where control of operations and tasking should reside. The specific answer 
varies with the technological level of the organization and the operation at hand. 
The answer has usually been: as far up the command ladder as possible, without 
saturating the command staff, and as far down the command ladder as absolutely 
required. As the Navy's data collection,  transmission and processing technologies 
advance, the tendency is for the Navy to move decision making further up the 
command ladder, because it is believed that all relevant information can be ac­
qui red and utilized at the higher levels of command. 
That is the wrong way to go. More and better information must be sent to the 
lowest level that has a directly involved decision maker with th e scope and train­
ing to understand and digest the information fully. The Navy must have and de­
pend upon experts operating in a loosely managed structure based on 
information freely flowing in all directi ons (on a sort of "information bus") . The 
management system of the future--a future which has already arrived-is the 
flight deck system writ large, the most appropriate system for a technologically 
advanced, responsive next Navy. 
The flight deck has burst the bounds of its specific context, and it is not 
much of an exaggeration to say that the entire Navy faces a flight deck 
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situation as it heads into the twenty-first century. In flight deck situations , a strict 
and rigid chain of command based on organizational rank does not work. What 
does work is a strict and flexible chain of command based on skill and knowl­
edge . What does work is having team members support the objective of the 
organization by doing their jobs well during operations in or at the edge of 
chaos . What does work is having the organization exist primarily to support its 
experts , enabling them to perform expertly within their areas of responsibil-
. 
. 
lty. 
In sum, here is what the flight deck teaches the Navy: 
• The function of the command levels is not to give ad hoc direction to 
the team, but to define its tasks and to give the team the training, tools , 
information , and support needed to accomplish its tasks. 
• For every sailor, officer and enlisted, the Navy must: 
• Define a reasonable scope of responsibility and authority 
• Provide training to do assigned tasks exceeclingly well 
• Provide accurate information needed to do the tasks 
• Recognize the experts' authority and importance and reward their 
performance 
Here endeth the lesson ,  but not the j ob---namely, becoming the next Navy. Now 
is the time to start. To that end, let us take a closer look at force structure and 
fleet organization . 
Force Structure 
There are really three force structures to be examined: one for today, the sec­
ond for tomorrow (the next Navy) , the third for the day after tomorrow (the 
Navy-after-next) . Since the world is changing far faster than it did at the delib­
erate pace of the recent past, all three structures must be considered simultane­
ously. The Navy does not have the luxury for sequential change through gentle 
stages at a measured pace. There is no time for that, because everything is hap­
pening all at once. 
Today the United States boasts the best Industrial Age navy, one already in 
transition to a trans-industrial (or post-industrial, or information ,  or knowl­
edge-age) navy. In the future, as in the present, the Navy must be able to thwart 
or defeat enemies and weapons of both the Industrial Age and its successor. 
Some countries will be converting from agricultural to industrial economies ,  as 
others move from industrial to trans-industrial economies. All countries will 
• In a certain sense, the organization subordinates itself to it< experts during edge-of-chaos operations.  
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change at different rates, and in some countries (such as China and India today) , 
various parts of society may leapfrog over whole stages of development. Gradual, 
sequential change is out of the question for them, j ust as it is for the United 
States . 
The extremely complex political-military environment will require some 
naval forces similar to those of the present ,  augmented by the ships and air­
craft programmed for procurement over the next few years .  That  will be the 
composition of the next Navy, tomorrow's Navy. The nation needs i t , but in 
and of itself the next Navy will be inadequate for the day after tomorrow. 
Buying large quantities of today's military tools to fight developing asym­
metric threats is simply not feasible ; America's defense budget cannot afford 
it .  Moreover, how many additional aircraft carriers ,  nuclear submarines ,  
stealth bombers and fighters, Super Hornets , main battle tanks , and Aegis 
cruisers will we need to counter people smuggling asymmetric weapons for 
use against the United States on its own territory? To counter terrorists and 
their methods? To counter advanced biological weapons in the hands of 
non-state enemies skilled in smuggling and terrorist techniques? Answer :  
more than the nation can afford. 
The Navy's experience in fighting drug smuggling is instructive . One ob­
vious lesson is that it is very expensive to use sophisticated and powerful 
Cold War-era combat systems against small and dispersed smuggling vehi­
cles . Using battle groups (with operating costs of about  half a million dollars 
per day-not counting the costs of capitalization ,  depreciation,  and military 
personnel) to counter light planes and small boats is a bit rich .  And the de­
gree of success does not come close to justifying the cost .  Cheaper and sim­
pler systems in larger quantities often prove to be more effective as well as 
more economical. 
As the threats and challenges change, and as capabilities for greater precision 
evolve, some economical and very unconventional naval forces can be devel­
oped-forces with higher orders of flexibility, agility, and global presence ability. 
They will be equipped with additional, and quite different, tools to fight the 
threats of the day after tomorrow. Such forces will be the nucleus of the Navy­
after-next. That Navy cannot yet be exactly defined, but the stage for it can be 
set now. 
I t  must be assumed that the Navy-after-next will be  composed of ships , 
aircraft. and submarines (though perhaps not exclusively-who knows?) . 
However, some speculation is useful .  and a few simple observations are ap­
propriate. 
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Ships 
Powerful Navy ships tend to be large and expensive (see sideb ar) , but they can 
b ecome cheaper and simpler as the infor mation age progresses.  In the fu­
tu re-more so than to day-the second stage of the weapo n system will fre­
quently be incorporated within the round. It will be less important to have 
heavy hulls that carry heavy, second-stage machines.  With speed, range, and ma­
neuverability increasingly engi neered and built into the rou nd, the re will be  di­
minished need for the same parameters in the combatant hull itself. Still , the 
to tal weapon syste m will be quicker, even though the launching platform may 
not be as fast and maneuverable as earlier pla tforms.  
Advanced information tec hnology and be tter information will enable mu ch 
more accurate targeting and weapon guidance. Naval forces will not need as 
many pieces of ordnance to provide the requisite explosive power for target de­
struction.  As well , magazine capacity for equivalent destructive power will de­
crease, and ammunition replenishment will drop in frequency. There will be a 
less critical requirement fo r reple nishment ships to haul ammunition to the bat­
tle area ,  because the co mbatant ships will be carrying what they need for the 
fight .  Indeed, transfer of munitions at sea is an inefficiency that the 
Navy-thanks to technology-will be able to reduce significantly or even avoid 
altogether. 
Since the cost of. weapon systems will be concentrated in the rounds,  each 
hull will not only be  relatively cheaper but also more lightly manned, requiring 
fewer people to maintain ,  operate, and pro tect a ship and its weapon systems. As 
components of a larger force dispersed over a wide area,  su ch ships can be knit 
together into a tigh t, resilient netwo rk for offense and defense. · The ships will 
go in to harm's way-there is no avoiding that-but the naval force 's damage 
con trol "compartments" will be separated by miles of seawa te r while re maining 
mutually suppo rtive. Of course , deploying such a force avoids the risk of p re­
senting a few expensive, massive targe ts to WMD. 
None of the foregoing is "pie in the sky." The "vision" can be engineered and 
built with today's technology (see sidebar) . 
As to the matter of size, tonnage is cheap in comparison with any o ther pa­
ramete r. In fact,  it can cost more to build a small ship than a large one, even if the 
combat systems of each are identical .  The critical measure of expense is life cycle cost 
• Comp uter-based communications already give the Navy the ability to communicate as efficiently and 
effectively between ships as within a single ship. Concentrating weaponry into o ne large ship no longer 
necessarily affords any gre ater ability to co ncentrate fires . Therefore there is no reason to accept the risk of 
putting most of the eggs into a few baskets, so to speak. 
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Why Navy Ships Are Big 
There are many reasons why Navy ships are big, but a few merit special note. The considera­
tions listed here apply to the whole gamut of warship types of the Industrial Age,from the 
Royal Navy's old sailing ships of the line to the most modern aircrcift carriers and cruisers. 
Almost all combatant ships are the first stage of the various weapon systems 
found aboard them. That is, the ships are the platforms which carry the heavy ma­
chines that constitute the second stages of the weapon systems . The second 
stages-those which deliver the warhead to the target area-are guns or airplanes 
or missiles. Because these second-stage machines are usually big and bulky, the 
ship that carries them is itself necessarily big and bulky. And , generally speaking, 
bigger guns and bigger planes-hence bigger ships-have been needed to put 
more range into the second stage. 
The direction and guidance of the weapon systems of the Industrial Age are 
imprecise relative to more modern weapons. Thus many pieces of ordnance (such 
as shells , b ombs, missiles , mines, and torpedoes) are required to e nsure target de­
structi on. Moreover, ships expend imprecise o rdnance rapidly when engaged in 
comb at, and neither returning to port nor replenishing daily underway is desirable 
during hostilities .  Thus, large magazines are required, and large magazines entail 
large ships . As well, large replenishment ships are required to carry more ammuni­
tion to the batde areas .  
Ships must go deep into harm's way b ecause most current weapo ns have lim­
ited range. Thus , ships require excellent speed, superior maneuverability, and 
elaborate damage control measures ,  including extensive compartmentation.  All 
these add more size and weight to ships already large. 
And cost: the propulsion power, maneuverability, and size are dearly paid for. 
Consequendy, Industrial Age warships are built with as much combat capacity as 
possible. 
In addition to making optimal use of ship size,  concentrating weaponry into 
one large ship facilitates communications . For Industrial Age warships , intra-ship 
boatswain's pipes,  bugles, sound-powered phones , and FM headsets are more reli­
able forms of communication than ship-to-ship signal flags, semaphore, flashing 
light, CW Morse, and UHE If the same amount of firepower is distributed among 
many different ships, it is difficult to control. Put another way, given Industrial Age 
communications constraints , it is easier to concentrate fire from one Industrial 
Age ship than from many. 
Of course, such ships require many people to maintain,  operate, and p rotect 
them. Large ships, large crews .  And large crews need more space for messing and 
berthing. 
The tendency, then, is to make Industrial Age ships very large indeed and to 
load them with expensive, complex weapon systems and many people. These ships 
are formidable, deadly, big, and valuable. 
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per unit of combat 1fectiveness. If building a larger hull with no attendant decrease 
in combat effectiveness can reduce life cycle costs , the choice is obvious-build 
the larger ship. One possibility is to equip cheap commercial hulls (usually nei­
ther fast nor mane uverable) wi th modularized combat systems . In addition to 
economy, these could realize the advan tage of disguise (denial of information 
through deception) while moving inconspicuously i n  the world's merchant traf­
fic patterns. 
Aircraft 
Like Navy ships,  powerful Navy aircraft tend to be large, heavy, and expensive 
(see sidebar) . They too can become smaller, lighter, and cheaper as the information 
age progresses. Some aircraft will not need human aircrews. Remotely piloted, 
they will also be remotely reprogrammed as required while in flight. Not all re­
motely piloted aircraft will need to be recovered; consequently, their airframes will 
not have to be as rugged as those that have to endure carrier landings. Precision * 
weapons will allow aircraft to destroy targets with fewer, smaller weapons. Smaller 
and fewer weapons mean smaller-hence less vulnerable--aircraft. 
Submarines 
For the future, submarines must retain their traditional and most effec tive 
functions . However, the challenge for the submarine force will be to maintain 
stealth characteristics while simultaneously improving command and control 
connectivity. t Sea denial capabili ties , long the "bread and butter" of the Silent 
Service, will be enhanced by the incorporation of new technologies .  Revolu­
tionary life-cycle cost advantages will also be realized when crew sizes decrease 
and when every facet of design, constru ction ,  operation,  and maintenance re­
flects that a nuclear submarine will be used for no longer than the life time of its 
first-and only-nu clear reactor core .  
§§§ 
* Precision is  really only half of the equation: p recision and speed are the winning combination in a weapon 
system. A phrase for the next century is "QUick and Exact ."  
t Bistatic targeting for submarine-la unched precision weap ons may avoid some of the knotty and vexing 
problems of subsurface-to-surface communications . 
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Why Navy Aircraft Are Big 
Piloted aircraft must carry at least one human, as well as  the fuel required to 
carry the human and weapons to the desired ranges. The human is needed to op­
erate and guide the weapon systems during the second stage of weapon deliv­
ery-namely, the delivery by aircraft .  Because most of today's weapons are rather 
"dumb" (with some weapons dumber than others) , the human provides a means 
to reprogram them during delivery from the ship to the target. 
The aircraft takes a tac tically significant amount of time to move the weapon 
to the target .  D uring that time, tactical conditions may change, necessi tating 
rapid human intervention in weapon delivery. Thus the human in the decision 
loop : the aircrew selects from a set o f targets and assigns weapons, while continu­
o usly evaluating the tactical environment-based on information obtained 
through onboard sensors and via radio nets that relay information from other 
databases (a cruiser's or a carrier's ,  for example)-and making necessary adj ust­
ments. By bringing human observation and analysis (and i nstinct) in communi­
cation with the weapons , the pilot adds flexibility and agility to the sec ond stage 
of weapon delivery. 
Navy aircraft are large also because they must carry many weapons . To con­
serve warfighting time by making fewer transits , many weapons are carried per 
sortie .  Moreover, targets and combat conditions may change in transit , so some­
times it  is necessary to carry different weapons on the same sortie .  
Obviously, a human is  needed to return the aircraft (which is a recoverable sec­
ond stage of the weapon system) to the ship (the first stage of the weapon system) , 
The physical laws of impulse and momentum dictate the use of large, extremely 
strong aircraft .  There is no getting around the fact  that combat aircraft must be 
able to endure repeated launches and recoveries and survive combat damage. 
Ships ,  aircraft, and submarines are quite effective at projecting American 
power, but nothing proj ects American power quite as convincingly as an infan­
tryman-well-trained, well-armed, determined, probably tired and impa­
tient-looking someone in the eye and telling him what to do. Nothing! The 
Navy, of course, does not have combat troops as the Army and Marines do. 
However, it is part of the same joint military team that is developing into a much 
more tightly knit force .  A major Navy mission is to bring that infantryman's 
power to bear, wherever it is needed, and to provide that trooper with absolutely 
reliable and effective support. As the cruising force of the Navy-after-next 
evolves ,  the Navy can embark platoons of combat troops on board each of i ts 
many, more lightly manned ships ,  The Navy-after-next will include ground 
forces in its wide range of distributed firepower, assembling them into larger 
concentrations as o ccasions demand. 
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Fleet Organization 
The Navy h a s  a n  effective fleet,  good enough to d o  most o f  today's j obs very 
well indeed. It  was built and organized on a model that was painfully developed 
and has proven to be effective , by heroes who deserve the greatest respect.  The 
Navy is rather comfortable with the model . It is an organization with which to­
day's admirals grew up, which they understand well, and to whi� they are loyal . 
However, it is not the right model for the future, or for the jobs that may be as­
signed to the Navy the day after tomorrow. The Navy cannot continue to be or­
ganized on the basis of its warfare specialties . 
If an automobile company were organized the way the Navy is , it would have 
a D epartment of Drill Presses,  a D epartment of Stamping Machines,  a Depart­
ment of Paint Stations,  a Department of Foundries ,  and so on,  with a vice presi­
dent in charge of each one. D epartments would be responsible for all operations ,  
maintenance, and training related to their equipment, wherever in the world it  
happened to be. Every manager and foreman in each department would have a 
lapel pin de noting rank (by color: gold for managers,  silver for foremen) and de­
partment (by shape:  drill press,  stamping machine, paint station ,  etc .) .  The com­
pany would have Drill Press Associations , Stamping Associations ,  Paint Shop 
As sociations , and Foundry Ass ociations .  Each tool association would have rank 
and representation in the corporate offices roughly comparable to the perceived 
impo rtance of the tool and to the power of the tool 's association. 
In  reali ty, healthy an d successful manufacturing organizations-actually, mos t 
commercial organizations of any type-instead organize themselves by product 
(or service) and function.  Usually they use a matrix o rgani zation of functions 
and products/services within each business unit. Corporate s taffs execute tasks 
(e .g. , marketing, legal) that are common or corporate only. Promotion to and 
representation within corporate ranks is dependent upon results :  that i s ,  upon 
how well the functions and products/services are managed and how the bottom 
line is affected. 
Of course, auto mobiles and industrial equipment are not the Navy's products . 
Nor are ships,  submarines,  or aircraft.  Rather, the Navy 's products are the warfa re ca­
pabilities it develops and riftnes in order to win battles and execu te missions at sea and 
from the sea. The Navy's business units are Fleets, Battle Forces (defined below) , 
and Task Forces .  Its bottom line is define d  not in dollars ,  but in what it costs to 
execute warfare missions and tasks-costs measured in terms of the warfare cur­
rencies of time, casualties ,  capital equipment, and supplies .  The Navy's tools are 
ships ,  planes , and submarines rather than foundries and drill presses .  
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Yet despite differe nces in detail , the Navy's current organization is analogous 
to the fictional business model described above. That organization must change. 
The Navy cannot afford its current structure: past, present, and future cuts reduce 
that structure's viability. Undeniable fiscal realities demand the planning and de­
sign of a different model. 
Organizational structure is one oj 
the obvious places in which to realize 
savings oj time, money, and billets. 
The Navy is p resently too hierar­
chical and too fragmented to be 
quick. It has too many staffs and 
too many distributed functions to 
be efficient. The Navy will be 
quicker and more efficient if it is 
organized less by its tools and 
more by its products a nd services, 
D OD must reduce the overhead oj numerous 
duplicative staffs in both its administra tive 
and operational chains oj command. 
-Senator Sam Nunn 
There is a lo t oj waste a nd duplication to be 
cut .  I -Senator C h arles Robb 
functions,  and business units. Its increased efficiency will reduce bottom-line 
costs. 
What "end state" should the Navy seek? Given an e nvironment of pervasive, 
rapid, and (probably) accelerating change,  it is not possible-at best,  it is impru­
dent-to define an end state for the Navy based on things-e.g. , ships , aircraft, 
and weapons.  The end state ought instead to be based on qualities-namely, un­
surpassed (and u nsurpassable) agility, flexibility, and quickness. 
A Notional Organizational Structure for the Next Navy 
In light oj the Joregoing considerations, this Newport Paper sets Jorth a notional struc­
ture Jor the next Navy, a structure that improves the effectiveness of the Navy 
while realizing efficiencies that will be necessary in the future. The proposed or­
ganization, composed of an operational structure and a support structure (see 
Chart 1) , is intended to meet efficie ntly the needs of the next Navy while it pre­
pares to become the Navy-after-next. 
Specifically, the primary obj ective of this reorganization is at least to main­
tain· quality in the "product line " (warfare capabilities) at current operational 
levels , while consolidating functions at the support levels .  The reorganizatio n is 
based on the following parameters: 
• At least to maintain, not only to maintain. Improvement is always a goal .  
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Chart 1 
FUNCTIONS 
COMNA VUSA FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS 
Maintenance 
Combat Operations Training and Fleet Fleet 
Support Support Doctrine Submarine Expeditionary 
CINCLANTFLT"" 
2"' FLT 
SOLANT 
6" FLT 
CINCPACFLTNIlT 
3ID FLT 
5'" FLT 
7TH FLT 
Note: The products (warfare capabilities) are incorporated in the commands Buixlrdinate to CINCLANTFLT .... 
and CINCPACFLT...., each of which is a complete package of Navy warfare capabilities. 
• Compliance with the law (Title 10 of the u. s. Code) in accordance 
with the intentions of Congress as specified in the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1 986 
• Distribution of functions and reduction of function duplication to real-
ize savings in manp ower and mo ney 
• A flatte ned structure to achieve speed and agility 
• Decentralized decision making for maximum flexibility and quickness 
• Increased regional presence to improve efficiency ashore and to increase 
involvement with civilian communities 
Many models can be made to work, and any model can be made not to work 
(or, by its critics , made to seem unworkable) . Most corporations that have tried 
various solutions to their own problems have failed in implementation, regardless 
of how accurate their diagnoses and prescrip tions we re . They simply could not 
stomach their own medicine. The real challenge facing the Navy is not so much 
to determine what its problems are and how to solve them, bu t to do what needs 
to be done.  
The Navy is  still in the diagnosis and prescription stage . Yet to come is the 
really tough part: taking its medicine. However difficult that task may be, i t  must 
be done, for to do nothing is to invite disaster, no matte r how much is said. 
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Notional Operational Structure 
The Chain of Command 
"The National Command Authori ties (NCA) , consisting of the President and 
the Secretary of Defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over 
the Armed Forces through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned 
to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the Military De­
partments and the Chiefs of the Services for those forces not assigned to the 
combatant commands., , 4 Our concern here is with the operational chain of 
command
, 
which flows from the NCA to the combatant commanders, also 
known as combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) . Each C INC holds war­
fighting responsibility for a geographic area of the world and is direcdy responsi­
ble to the NCA for mission execution and readiness. A component commander 
from each of the armed forces serves each C INe. 
In the next Navy, the naval component commanders for the C INCs are 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Adantic Fleet (C INCLANTFLTnexJ and Com­
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (C INCPAC FLTnext) . Each has a broad geo­
graphic scope, but a narrow functional scope. The geographic scope of 
CINCPAC FLT next '  with headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii , is roughly equiva­
lent to that of the traditional CINCPACFLT. CINCLANTFLTnex, ' with headquar­
ters currendy in Naples, Italy, has a geographic scope roughly equivalent to the 
areas of responsibility traditionally assigned to C INCUSNAVEUR and 
CI NCLANTFLT, combined. In this construct, PAC OM and CENTC OM are 
serviced by CINCPACFLTnext ; EUCOM and SOUTHC OM are serviced by 
CINCLANTFLT next .  
These fleet commanders focus on joint warfare capabilities, the true products if the 
Navy. The agile, responsive support structure of the next Navy-the notional 
Commander, Naval Forces in the United States (COMNAVUSA)-is responsi­
ble for supporting the fleet commanders across the full range of combat func­
tions. 
Operational Structwe: Primary Staff Functions of the Navy Component 
Commander in Support of Serviced Combatant Commanders 
In support of the CINCs whom they service, CINCLANTFLTnex, and 
CI NCPAC FLTnex,' as currently directed by QCS : 5 
• Make recommendations for force employment 
• Accomplish all operational missions assigned by the combatant CINCs 
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• Select  and nominate specific Navy units for assignment to othe r subor­
dinate j oint forces 
• Conduc t j oint training 
• Inform combatant commanders of changes in logistic support that 
will significantly affect their planning and ability to execute their mis­
SIOns 
• Develop program and budge t requests that comply with the combatant 
commanders ' guidance on warfare re quirements and priorities 
• Inform combatant commanders of program and budget decisions that 
may affect planning of joint operations 
• Provide naval force data in support of j oint operations and exercise 
plans 
CINCLANTFLTnext and CINCPACFLTnext are also respo nsible for the fol-
lowing service-specific functions within each combatant command: 
• Internal administration and discipline 
• Training in Navy doctrine, tactics ,  and techniques 
• Naval logistic functions 
• Naval intelligence 
Withi n their own commands the Navy component commanders are respon-
sible for :  
• The training and readiness o f  battle fleets and task groups 
• Navy operational and battle planning 
• D efinition of Navy tactical warfare requirements 
Operational Structure: Direct Subordinates of the Navy Component 
Commanders 
Directly subordinate to the Navy component commanders are the Numbered 
Fleet Commanders (NFCs) /Joint Force Commanders OFCs) . COMSOLANT, 
SECOND, and SIXTH Fleets are subordinate to CINCLANTFLT next; THIRD, 
FIFTH , and SEVENTH Fleets are subordinate to CINCPACFLTnext . Each NFCI]FC 
has direct liaison with the supportingJunctional commands under COMNAVUSA . 
Immediately below the numbered fleet level are the next Navy's six bat tle 
forces, with each battle force commander directly subordinate to a numbered fleet 
commander. Each battle force is built around a permanently assigned core of 
two aircraft carriers and two amphibious assault ships ;  other ships,  aircraft, sub­
marines, ground fo rces,  and expeditionary units are assigned as appropriate. Like 
an NFC/JFC, a battle force staff has direct liaison with the functional commands s ubordi­
nate to COMNAVUSA . 
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Each battle force is the primary nexus for the administration , training, and 
co mmand and control of the combat units assigned to it. That is, there are in the 
next Navy six principal junctions where support and operations co n­
nect-namely, the six battle forces .  In each battle force the shore support fo r 
ships, aircraft, and submarines converges with the operation of combat units on,  
above, or  under the  sea .  In particular, a battle fo rce i s  the  point at  which all sin­
gle- and multi-unit underway training is tie d toge ther. The responsibility for 
training a given battle force and its units lies solely with the battle force co m­
mander and key subordinates in command. That is, the battle force co mmander, 
staff, and subordinate commanding office rs-rather than seve ral dispersed 
training commands afloat and as hore-coordinate, c onduct, an d  evaluate sin­
gle- and multi-unit training in accordance with flee t-wide gui dance and stan­
dards established by the next Navy's Fle e t  Training and Do ctrine Command 
(se e  page 42) . The battle fo rce is  the point of crossove r between the adminis­
trative and operational structures .  
On a smaller scale,  a task force i s  a subse t of units drawn ad hoc from within a 
given battle force for assignment to an NFC/]Fe. It is organize d and trained to 
meet specific needs of a combatant CINe. At the direction of a CINC, special­
ized assets may be assigned to augment a task force .  For example,  a task force re­
quiring a more robust surveillance capability could draw on SEAL teams, MPA, 
special mission submarines, UAV squadrons, etc. 
Also directly under the Navy component commande rs are fo rces with highly 
specialized missions. These forces,  composed of units ofte n found in relatively 
small numbers: can be assigned as elements of task forces or as corps-level forces 
with specific missions. 
Lastly, C INCLANTFLT next and CINCPACFLT next each have a Fleet Tactics and 
Planning Support Group. The Group trains task forces in joint warfare tactics 
(training in unit tactics falls under the purview of battle forc e commanders) , and 
it supports an NFC/]FC in campaign (ope rational level) planning. 
Notional Support Structure 
Commander, Naval Forces in the United States (COMNAVUSA) provides 
support in training, tactical development, perso nnel, maintenance,  co mmunica­
tions, intelligence, and logistics to the Navy component commanders , worldwide. 
COMNAVUSA is the provider of all forces to CINCLANTFLTnext and 
• For example: MPA, SeaBees, submarines, salvage units, replenishment ships,  unique training assets . 
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CINCPACFLT next for operation by their subordinate commande rs .  Headquarters 
for C OMNAVUSA is Norfolk, Virginia .  
CO MNAVUSA i s  a supporting struc tu re whose very design aims a t  improving 
response times and reducing expenditures by consolidating common func tions 
and eliminating redundant support billets. Commanders in the supporting 
structure have responsibili ty for fewer fu nctions . However, their geographic 
scope is (world)wide while their fu nctional scope is narrow. · 
C OMNAVUSA is an unequivocal ,  thoroughgoing shift away from the organ­
izational struc tu re of today's Navy. The shift is driven by the need for the next 
Navy to utilize the organizational schemes of successful modern busi­
nesses-schemes proven to work in the trans-industrial age. The Navy's current 
organization is built around platform stovepipes (air, surface, and subsurface) , 
each one incorporating the primary functions of maintenance, training, logistics, 
and personnel management. That method of organization has been effective, but 
also intfficient. 
The next Navy's organization realizes efficiency in a modern matrix sche me, 
in which the columns are junctions (e. g. , maintenance, training, personnel , logis­
tics) , and the rows are waifare capabilities (see Chart 1 ) .  One advantage that imme­
diately results is a sharpening of command focus.  COMNAVUSA focuses on 
effective accomplishment of functions necessary to enable and sustain naval war­
fare ; CINCLANTFLT next and CINCPACFLT next focus on the operation and figh t­
ing of naval forces at sea. As the Navy component commanders for the 
combatant CINCs, they have control of all Navy operations, either directly or 
through their subordinate commanders . Subordinate NFCs are routinely as­
signed as j oint force commanders or as the Navy component  commanders of 
joint force commands .  
Efficiency is also immediately achieved by an elimination of redundancy. To­
day's Navy has six major type commands, each one having its own maintenance 
organization , compose d of experts and supporting personnel .  Withou t cutting the 
numbers oj "value-added " maintenance experts, the next Navy obtains the following 
benefits from the consolidation of redundant functions : 
• Greater interaction between experts in the same functional field (effi­
cient use of tal ent) 
• Reduction of the number of supporting personnel required to serve the 
experts (efficient use of people) 
Furthermore, the next Navy is more efficient by virtue of its improved, 
streamlined coordination among functions. The organizational structure of 
• New informa tion technologies enable this to be done . Learning the effective and efficient use of these 
technological advances  is imperative . 
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today's Navy is seriously weak in its coordination of functions between plat­
forms of different types: among its thick-walled stovepipes, functions are dupli­
cated at great cost (in people and money) and with little or no inter-type 
coordination. That arrangement does not appropriately use the information 
technology of the current era, and it does not facilitate joint operation of the 
u. s. Armed Forces. The organization of the next Navy corrects those deficien­
cies. Since functions are not duplicated across platform types, many fewer staff 
personnel are required to coordinate special platform needs across functions. 
Coordination of functions for specific operational needs falls to the naval war­
fighting staffs. 
As in today's Navy, in the modern matrix the Navy component commanders, 
CINCLANTFLT next and CINCPACFLT next ' represent the combatant CINCs to 
the Navy (and vice versa) . Also in continuity with the current structure, the 
numbered fleet commanders may act as joint force commanders or as naval 
component commanders for jFCs. However, the NFCs currently have little im­
pact on the functional support they receive, except through the traditional fleet 
CINCs (CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT) , often via the platform type com­
manders. In contrast, the next Navy's modern matrix provides flatter, better, and 
more efficient support of the NFC/jFC and the other naval operators . 
Support Structure: COMNAVUSA Staff 
(Centralized Functions) 
Briefly, the COMNAVUSA staff functions are: Navy component commander 
for USACOM; battle technology innovation; comptroller; fleet warfare require­
ments; measuring and monitoring fleet readiness; public affairs; and legal services. * 
COMNAVUSA will be the Navy component commander Jor USACOM. 
USACOM is a unified combatant command whose missions are to : 
• Plan and execute operations within its area of responsibility 
• Conduct joint training of assigned cONUS-based forces and jTF staffS 
• Provide trained and ready joint forces to supported CINCs as directed 
by the National Command Authority 
COMNA VUSA remains the single point of contact Jor USACOM on all matters 
related to Navy component Junctions. While retaining overall responsibility, it trans­
fers the following operational functions of the USACOM Navy component 
* A note on staff composition: the COMNAVUSA staff includes a Chief Operating Officer (civilian) , but not 
a deputy commander. The Chief Operating Offic er ensures the continuity of policy and management 
expertise that c an be gained only through long-term, deep , accountable involvement. 
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Whither USACOM? 
Over time, USACOM will probably evolve into a joint training and readiness 
conunand similar to that suggested in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1 986. This 
concept was supported by General Colin Powell, C)CS ; envisioned and ordered by 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1993;  and approved by President Bill Clinton on 
September 29, 1993. Specifically, USACOM will probably develop into an organiza­
tion that: 
• Forms, trains , and provides joint task forces (or groups or elements) to the 
combatant CINCs or Joint Force Commanders, in response to the mission 
requirements of the other CINCs and the Secretary of Defense . 
• Provides military support and assistance during natural disasters or civil dis­
turbances in CONUS 
• Plans for the land defense of CONUS 
• Turns over responsibility for all nations, territories, and non-national seas in 
the current USACOM area of responsibility to o ther combatant CINCs 
• Divests itself of NATO responsibilities as SACLANT 
When the ocean areas currently assigned to USACOM pass to other combatant 
CINCs, COMNAVUSA will directly execute all Navy component functions for 
USACOM . 
commander to C INCLANTFLTnex1 and/or C INCPACFLTnexl: 
• Make recommendations for force employment 
• Accomplish assigned operational missions 
• Select and nominate specific Navy u nits for assignment to other subor­
dinate joint forces 
• Conduct joint training 
• Inform USACOM of changes in logistic support that have significant ef­
fects on planning 
• Provide force data in support of joint operation and exercise plans 
• Conduct training in Navy doctrine, tac tics,  and techniques 
COMNAVUSA directly executes the following service-specific fu nctions 
within USACOM: 
• Develop program and budget requests that comply with USACOM 
guidance on warfare requirements and priorities 
• Inform USACOM of program and budget decisions that may affect 
planning of joint operations 
• Provide internal administration and discipline 
• Execu te Navy logistic functions within the command 
• Supervise Navy intelligence matters and activities 
In the battle technology innovation area, the staffis under the direction of a senior 
civilian executive, and administers the Navy Science Assistance Program 
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(NSAP) . COMNAVUSA staff is linked to the technical ne twork of warfare cen­
ters; program executives;  OPTEVFOR; private industry; Navy and other service 
laboratories;  university laboratories;  national laboratories ;  and foreign navies .  
The staff identifies flee t  needs that may b e  me t by the utilization of new tech­
nologies and-within the constraints of security re quire ments-co mmunicates 
these nee ds to ele ments of the ne two rk. To be effective in this endeavor, 
COMNAVUSA staff must maintain awareness of promising new technological 
applications and concepts . (Given the explosive rate of technological develop­
ment, that is a challenge. )  Lastly, COMNAVUSA staff conducts and analyzes ex­
periments for assessment of technical initiatives, and facilitates "fast track" 
integration of innovative technologies with new or modifi ed doctrine , tactics ,  
and techniqu es .  
The COMNAVUSA comptroller provides resou rces directly to operating forces 
and to Naval Region Commande rs· for the infrastructure within their  responsi­
bility. The comptroller also : 
• Centralizes budgeting, and monitors and manages bu dge t execution 
• Works with operating forces to maximize readiness at the lowest possi­
ble financial costs 
• Distributes accountability to decision levels 
• Compiles and submits resource requirements to Financial Management 
Budget (FMB) 
COMNAVUSA staff has overall responsibility for the definition and submis­
sion of fleet warfare requiremen ts. It consolidates warfighting require ments from 
CINCLANTFLTnex, and C INCPACFLTnex, ' and combat support re quirements 
from the functional commanders. COMNAVUSA then sub mits all fleet warfare 
requirements to the Navy budget and program authorities.  As a Navy compo­
nent commander, COMNAVUSA advises USAC OM of Navy bu dget and pro­
gram decisions affecting joint warfare requirements . Similarly, COMNAVUSA 
advises CINCLANTFLTn ex, and CINCPAC FLTnex, of those de cisions affecting 
their own functions as Navy component commanders. 
COMNAVUSA is the central authority for measuring and monitoringfleet readi­
ness, setting standards and objectives in concert with se rviced co mmands and 
organizations . The staff establishes measures; collects data into a single, widely 
accessible database ; and provides exp ert fee dback to managers of serviced 
commands and organizations . Attached to the staff is a neutral measure­
ment  and analysis group similar to NWAD Corona, incorporating skills and 
personnel found in organizations of inspectors general. COMNAVUSA uses 
• These are no tional entities whose functions are described below. 
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non-financial measures of combat readiness , combat efficiency, organizatio nal 
efficiency, and organizational effectiveness . 
Lastly, COMNAVUSA is in charge of fleet public affairs and legal services. 
Support Structure: Direct Subordinates of COMNAVUSA 
(Decentralized Functions) 
Functional commanders in the next Navy's COMNAVUSA are analogous to 
the level of executive management often referred to as type co mmanders in to­
day's Navy. Six executives, assigned as Echelon III  commanders, execute the 
functions required to support forces afloat. Their commands are Fleet Training 
and Doctrine Command; Fleet Maintenance Command; Fleet Combat Support 
Command; Fleet Submarine Command; Fleet Expeditionary Command; and 
Fleet Operations Support Command. They are described in more detail below. * 
Fleet Training and Doctrine Command (three stars , unrestricted line) : 
• Fleet Manpower Distribution Center 
• Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center (incorporates SWDG, SUBDEV-
RONs, VXs, NSAWC, and NAVDOC) 
• Fleet Training Center (includes some fleet schools) 
• Naval War College 
• Fleet Chaplains Center 
Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center develops, formulates, and evaluates doc­
trine and tactics for naval platforms ,  units , battle forces , and task forces (see Ap­
pendix B) . It  maintains close working relationships with joint and unique 
service commands also focused on tactics and doctrine. 
Fleet Training Center provides standards and measures for all fleet unit train­
ing, as well as measurement guidance and analysis to battle force commanders in 
support of unit and force training. The standards and measures focus on the tasks 
essential to the execution of Navy missions, and emphasize time as a measure of 
readiness (see page 62).  
Fleet Maintenance Command (ships and aircraft; three stars , unrestricted line) : 
• Director, Maintenance Resources (senior civilian executive) 
• I ndustrial Facilities Manager (two stars , restricted line) 
• Director, Fleet Tec hnical Support Center (one star, restricted line) 
• Director, Maintenance and Modernization (one star, restricted line) 
* N .B. Flanening is not necessarily related to rank--che Navy can have a flat o rganization w i th twice as 
many three-star admirals. Rather. flattening is related essentially to how many (or how few) wickets a decision 
must go through before action is taken. Puc another way. the question to ask in assessing the flatness of an 
organization is "How convoluted is the path that a customer must take to get the needed product or service?"  
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• Maintenance Processes Manager (senior civilian executive) 
Director, Maintenance Resources includes Budgets and Schedules ; Hu man 
Resources and Maintenance Training; Business Measures and Analysis ;  Con­
tracts ; and Comptroller Linkage. 
Industrial Facilities Manager includes Fleet Maintenance Facilities ;  Indus­
trial Policy; Manufacturing; Repair ;  Technology; and Intermediate Mainte­
nance.  
Director, Fleet Technical Support Center includes Ship Systems ; Combat 
Systems ; Aviation Systems; C41 Systems ; FTSC Detachments ; Technical Library; 
and Platform Configuration Records . 
Director, Maintenance and Modernization includes Regional Maintenance 
Centers ; Surface and CV /CVN; Submarines ; Aircraft ;  Craft and Boats; Compo­
nents ; and Maintenance Requirements. 
Maintenance Processes Manager includes Quality Assurance;  Work Docu­
ments ; Job Control ;  and 3M. 
Fleet Combat Support Command (three stars , unrestricted line ;  deputy is the di-
rector of Logistics Support) : 
• Logistics Support (two stars , Supply Corps) 
• Strategic Lift (one-star, unrestricted line) 
• Combat Engineering Support (two stars, Civil Engineer Corps) 
• Health Affairs (one star, Medical, Dental , or Medical Service Corps) 
Logistics Support includes FISC Operations, Plans , and Policy (there are six 
FISCs-Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, Puget S ound, San Diego, Norfolk, Jackson­
ville) ;  Acquisition; Fleet Inventory Management and Fuels Service; and Ord­
nance Management Service. 
Strategic Lift includes Military Sealift Transportation Service (MSTS) ; Com­
bat Logistics Force;  and Cargo Handling Support Group. 
Combat Engineering Support includes Navy Mobile Construction Battal­
ions and Unde rwater Construction Teams. 
Health Affairs includes Fleet Hospitals; Medical and Dental ; Sanitation ; and 
Mortuary Affairs . 
Fleet Submarine Command (three stars , unrestricted line) : 
• Maritime Patrol C ommand (two stars, unrestricted line) 
• Underwater Surveillance Center (one star, unrestricted line) 
• Fleet Strategic Submarine Force (one star, unrestricted line; worldwide 
operations) 
• Fleet Submarine Force (two stars , unrestricted line ; worldwide opera­
tions) 
Fleet Expeditionary Command (two stars , u nrestricted line) : 
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• Mine Warfare Command (one star, unrestricted line) 
• Navy Special Warfare Command (one star, restricted line) 
• Fleet Special Operations and Construction Command (one star, line or  
staff; CBs,  EOD, ACUs, MDSU, etc . )  
Fleet Operations Support Command (two stars, unrestricted or restricted line ; 
Commander double-hatted as the Fleet Information Officer) : 
• Fleet Network Services 
• Flee t  Informatio n Services 
• Fleet Infor mation Warfare Centers 
Fleet Network Services is resp onsible fo r ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore 
connectivity, and for LAN and WAN operations . 
Fleet Info rmation Services includes Intelligence Service ;  Cryptography 
Service ;  and Database Maintenance. 
In addition to the six fu nctional commanders there are eight Naval Region 
Commanders (two stars, unrestricted line) subordinate to COMNAVUSA. They 
maintain close ties to civilian communities and Federal Executive Boards. To the 
extent feasible, the Naval Region Commanders consolidate all common func­
tions of tenant commands in a given area: Such functions include administra­
tion; public safety; fuel; food services; child care ; personnel support; brig; rolling 
stock; public affairs;  legal services ;  medical/dental; environmental health and 
safety; buildi ng maintenance ;  public works ; utilities; housing; construction;  and 
recreation. The Naval Regions are: 
• Naval Region Washington , D. c. 
• Naval Region Northeast 
• Federal Regions 1 and 2 (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massa­
chusetts , Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, N ew Jersey) 
• Europe and Mrica 
• Naval Region Mid-Atlantic 
• Federal Regions 3 and 5 (Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan , Illinois , Wisconsin, Minne­
sota) 
• Canada 
• Naval Region S outheast 
* One way for Naval Region Commanders to consol idate functions is to make the commanding officers of 
major commands within the regions perform additional duties as functional managers , Functional 
management thus goes to subordinate c ommanders ,  not to the staff of the Naval Region C ommander. This 
method of consolidation has the meri t  of broadening a commander's geographic perspective with a functi onal 
pe�pective that e ncompasses an entire regio n  and crosses warfare community lines. The Naval Region 
Commander arbitrates disputes among functional managers in a region, but is not routinely involved in 
functional management. 
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• Federal Region 4 (North Carolina, South Carolina,  Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi , Tennessee, Kentucky) 
• South America, Puerto Rico, Caribbean 
• Naval Region Midwest 
• Federal Regions 6 and 7 (Louisiana, Texas , New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas , Nebraska, Iowa) 
• Central America 
• Naval Region So uthwest 
• Federal Region 9 (California , Arizona, Nevada; not Hawaii) 
• South Asia 
• Naval Region Northwest 
• Federal Regions 8 and 1 0  (Washington ,  Alaska,  Oregon ,  Idaho, U tah , 
Colorado, Wyoming, Mo ntana, North Dakota, South Dakota) 
• Northeast Asia 
• Naval Region Pacific 
• Hawaii 
• Guam, Central Pacific, Southwest Pacific,  Southeast Asia 
Warfare Commu nity Representation and Leadersh ip 
in the Next Navy 
Airplanes, missiles, submarines, ships ,  and boats are tools with which the 
Navy's products-waifim capabilities-are built. The next Navy is organized on the 
basis of Junctions and products, not tools. Functional commanders command the 
combat support structure, and joint force commanders (who are often num­
bered fleet commanders) apply the naval warfare capabilities required by the 
combatant C INCs . 
Senior submarine, surface, air, amphibious, and mine warfare specialists are 
designated the "champions "  of their respective warfare communities .  H owever, 
three-star communi ty representation and leadership is discontinued, j ust as 
three-star program sponsors were downgraded on the staff of the Chief of Naval 
O perations in 1 993 . The Navy no longer needs communi ty representation and 
leadership at  the headquarters level-j ust as industrial firms no lo nger nee d drill 
press, foundry, and welding machine community representation and leadership 
at the corporate level. 
Nevertheless, in the next Navy, significant warfare community representation 
continues at the headquarters level in the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Op­
erations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N8, OPNAV) . By 
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virtue of its focus on program sponsorship, N8 is charged with planning for fu­
ture technologies and programs within the " toolkits" of the warfare commu ni­
ties .  
The numbered fleets have air, surface, submarine, and amphibious warfare 
specialties represented by staff warfare specialists. These staff experts submit in­
puts to CINCLANTFLT next and CINCPACFLT next (via the NFCs) on near-term 
warfare requirements . Staff warfare specialists also link with the functional struc­
ture and i nfluence it through their expertise. 
The six battle force commanders have staff elements and subordinate flag of­
ficers with warfare specialty foci. Each submits inputs on requirements defini­
tion and program administration directly to an NFC. 
Most of the fleet schools will maintain a community focus. 
§§§ 
The bottom line:  warfare community representation and leadership are re­
duced in the next Navy. Now is the time to do this .  It is a notion whose time has 
come-again . Decades ago, Navy leadership had all flag officers remove their 
badges of community identification at the time of promotion to flag rank. The 
wisdom behind that action must once again prevail as the Navy steps forward 
into the era of genuine joint warfare effectiveness . 
Some excellent Sailors may be unable to make this adj ustment. Over the years 
they have developed an intense loyalty to the tools of their trade, often at the ex­
pense of higher loyalty to the Navy. It is time to help them find remunerative 
employment in follow-on careers .  They should be rewarded handsomely for 
their years of good and faithful service. (The reader should understand that not 
an ounce of sarcasm is intended here.) They have followed their leaders , have 
served the Navy and the nation well, and have made many sacrifices. The Navy 
and the nation owe them a tremendous debt of gratitude. 
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. . .  and how to do it .  

Getting from. Here to Tll1Lere� 
The Most DifficlIJlllt Part 
And, oj course, the toughest part oj the equation is how we get from here to there. 
-Senator Charles Robb 
One may know how to conquer without being able to do it. 
-Sun Tzu 
C
HANGING AN ORGANIZATION as large and complex as the Navy is a 
challenging undertaking. No one person and no one staff can know or re­
solve all the issues and details.  What is more, not even all the Sailors and all the 
staffs can know all of the issues and details before change begins. Nonetheless,  a 
destination, a goal, or a port to steer for is required; this Newport Paper seeks to 
define that goal. Once the goal is defined, actio n can-must-begin .  
The Navy must be willing to  sail in these new seas , to leave the comforts of 
old, familiar shores and cruise into the unknown. It must make all preparations 
for getting underway. Then it must weigh anchor and depart the anchorage, be­
ing careful to keep the ancho r at short stay in case so mething goes wrong. The 
following are the steps the Navy should start taking now. 
• Single up all type commanders , focusing them on unit-type training, 
tactics, and safety. The six type commanders become three :  
• COMNAVSURFOR-Commander, Naval Surface Force, Norfolk, 
Virginia 
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• COMNAVAIRFOR-Commander, Naval Air Force, San Diego, 
California 
• COMSUBFOR -Commander, Submarine Force, Norfolk, Virginia . 
During the period of transition, each type commander takes the 
former geographic counterpart as deputy (e.g . , COMNAVSURFPAC becomes 
Deputy, COMNAVSURFOR) . 
• Shift to a battle force structure 
• Move all fleet maintenance to a single Fleet Maintenance Command 
• Move all fleet supply, inventory management , and ordnance manage­
ment to a single Fleet Combat Support Command 
• Establish the naval regions as described herein 
When the Navy is well clear of the anchorage and in the channel, it must get 
some way on, leave the harbor, and steer for sea. At that point it should: 
• Institute CINCPACFLTnexl ' CINCLANTFLTnexl ' and COMNAVUSA as 
described herein 
• Eliminate type commands and shift to functional commands as de­
scribed herein 
• Focus the fleet inspectors general on non-financial standards , measures , 
analysis , and management assistance in support of training and readiness 
§§§ 
Each of the commands and staffs involved in any of the changes recom­
mended is laden with highly educated and thoroughly experienced talent. This 
talent must be channeled as necessary to lead the entire Navy and the broader 
joint structure into the twenty-first century. Change can be implemented only 
through leadership that is effective, even (at times) inspiring. 
The voyage the Navy faces now is different from any other that it has taken. 
To ensure the Navy successfully navigates and dominates the new seas it sails ,  
Navy leadership needs some new tools and weapons, and the understanding to 
use them competently. Specifically, these are :  
• Organizational quickness 
• A focus on time as a measure of readiness , effectiveness , and efficiency 
• A refined, streamlined requirements process 
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Get Q u ick 
A ll Organizations Should Give Primary Emphasis To Developing Quickness. * 
The reader is probably familiar with an obj ect called "the learning curve," the 
S-shaped curve that shows how the rate at which one learns something varies 
with time. The learning rate starts slowly; gradually and then more rapidly in­
creases;  and finally tapers off to something very close to the initial learning rate .  
Plotting "Amount Learned" on the vertical , and "Time Sp ent Learning" on the 
horizontal ,  a typical curve looks like this (see Figure 1 ) .  
1 
Figure 1 :  The Learning Curve 
Time Spent Learning � 
The learning curve describes the rate at which people learn calculus, for ex­
ample. Initially baflling, or at least tedious, it soon starts to become clear. Then 
they rapidly absorb differentiation, integration , partial differentials , and multiple 
* 
In the context of this paper, 'quick"ess' implies the ability of an organization o r  person to adapt  itselfrapidly 
and agilely to a changing environment. This section uses the S-curve to demonstrate why the Navy must 
become a qu icker organizatio n  by de creasing its decision cycle times. Read patiently and carefully, and the 
point-GET QUICK-will be clear. 
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integrals .  However, learning may slow down a bit when they hit vector calculus ,  
multivariable a nalysis ,  Bessel functions,  and Gu dermanian fu nctions in hyper­
bolic trigonometry. 
Similar S-curves are used to describe phase transitions in the natural scie nces 
and in the development of business organizations (from entrepreneurial begin­
nings, through rapid expansion, to maturity) : The S-curve applies also to the de­
velopment of societies. It shows how societies evolve during what is called a 
"paradigm shift" (in one parlance) or a "phase shift" (in another) . The Renaissance 
was such a shift ,  as was the Industrial Revolution. For example, an S-curve can be 
used to describe the rates at which industrial society developed during the I ndus­
trial Revolution: initially changing very slowly, then very rapidly, and then very 
slowly again .  Modern industrialized societies are now at the far right side (the flat­
ter portion) of the curve. That portion of the curve looks like this (see Figure 2) . 
-
c 
� 0-a 
1 
c 
Figure 2 
11me Spent Developing 
* In 1 98 1 , Jonas Salk used an S-curve to describe the evolution, gro wth, and de velopment of Jiving systems . 
He claimed that the S-curve applied not only to biological systems, but also to social systems . Although Salk's 
claim was accepted by some, it was criticized by others . Nevertheless, over the next decade the S-curve 
conc ept was successfully applied by some authors and co nsultants to manageme nt theory and technological 
innovatio n. I n  the development of complexity theory, biotechnologists , economists, chemists, and physicists 
have used S-curves to describe phase transitio ns of co evolving social and technological structures. 
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An S-curve also describes how human socie ty is developing during the c ur­
rent trans-industrial revolution .  In this case, the world is now on the left side of 
the curve and-as this write r and many others believe-j ust entering the steep 
slope portion . That means that the po rtion of the curve relevant to this period 
looks something like this (see Figure 3) . 
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Figure 3 
Time Spent Developing 
Of course, there is no way of knowing, without the wisdom of hindsight,  
what the exact shape of the curve really is or where the trans-industrial world is 
located on it . · However, if the above assessment of the trans-indus trial period is 
close to correct, then organizations today face a very different problem on the 
steep portion of the trans-industrial curve than they did in the flattened, right­
hand portion of the industrialization curve. 
To make this point clearer, consider portions of the curve more closely and 
with a more analytical eye , starting with the mature end of the industrialization 
curve. 
• The wri ter suspects that the s teep p ortion of the trans-industri al S-curve, because of the very rapid rate of  
change in this era, will be  much steeper than the analogous portion of  the  i ndustrializatio n  S-c urve. But  that 
opinion need not be argued fo r this discussion. 
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Referring to Figure 4, suppose the Navy is at time x and wa nts to define how 
it must  develop to execute i ts missions-and thus survive and prosper-fifteen 
years from now, at time x + 1 5 .  (This assumes it takes about fifteen years to reori­
ent th e  Navy comple tely.) 
1 
I 
l 
Figure 4 
X-i S x X+i S  
TIme Spent Developing 
Line A represents the extension oj the present as a flat line into the future. It is 
the projection commonly used by people who, for one reason or  another, do not 
want to acknowledge change. 
Line B represents a projection from an understanding oj the past. It  looks back at 
how things were (the time in terval depends on how good the line-drawer's sense 
of history is) , and extends from that point through the present. This is  the ap­
proach that uses "the voice of experience." In the Navy's case, this is the voice of 
admirals supported by experienced staff officers and civil servants .  
Note that at time x +1 5 ,  the lines come somewhat close together in this sec­
tion of the curve (the mature portion of the industrialization curve, where the 
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nation's institutions-including the Navy-and its citizens grew up) . In fact, at 
x+1 5 the "no change" line A is below the curve by about the same amount that 
the "voice of experience" line B is above it. Regarding future needs , then,  this 
means that in a world of political discussion and compromise, in a time of ade­
quate resources, the development agreed upon is probably very close to what 
will actually be needed at year x+1 5 .  
Now consider the beginning portion of  the new S-curve .  This is the trans­
industrial section-the part of the curve that applies to the current era .  Again, sup­
pose the Navy is at time x, and it wants to define how it must develop to execute 
its missions (and thus survive and prosper) at time x+1 5 , fifteen years into the fu­
ture (see Figure 5) . 
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Figure 5 
X-1 5 x X+1 5 
Time Spent Developing 
Line A again represents the extension of the present as a flat line into the fu ture .  
At time x+1 5 this line is  furthest from the curve ;  that is, A illustrates what is 
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probably the most unrealistic approach in the definition of future needs . How­
ever, because the nation has been in the flat, later portion of the industrialization 
curve (the one it has grown to know and love) ,  the re is a tendency among some 
to continue to use this approach, especially since it seemed to work reasonably 
well in the past (see Figure 4) . 
Line B again represents a proj ection from an understanding of the past. It looks 
back at how things were (how far back depends on how good the line-drawer's 
se nse of history is) , and draws from that point through the present. As the "voice 
of experience" approach, it is  more realistic than line A, but it still misses the 
curves in Figures 4 and 5 at time x + 1 5 .  In the mature industrial curve (Figure 4) , 
B misses the actual curve (reality) on the high side-which is what American 
society and the Congress have for years been trying to tell the Navy. How­
ever-and this is very significant-in the young trans-industrial curve (Fig­
ure 5) ,  B misses the actual curve on the low side. That is ,  the "voice of 
experience" approach now undershoots reality. 
Line C represents a projection from an understanding of the present. This line is 
tangent to th e curve at time x, and is what the approach of the "futurists "* really 
is .  C is a more realistic approach than A or B, if the line is accurately drawn. 
However, since not all "futurists" draw line C in exactly the same way, how is the 
Navy to know which one has drawn it correctly? It is excee dingly difficult for an 
institution deeply rooted in the past to understand perfectly the realities of the 
present . 
Note that in the young trans-industrial curve--the one the Navy dimly per­
ceives and does not yet understand-all lines badly undershoot the curve at time 
x+15 .  No prediction comes close enough to future reality to make the Navy feel 
comfortable about the way it will be going. 
What can the Navy do? One imperative is apparent: shorten the interval be­
tween time x and the targeted future by quickening the Navy's organizational 
perceptions and reactions. The Navy can then more accurately predict and de­
fine, and more effectively meet,  the requirements of the fu ture time . 
For example, suppose the time interval for reorienting a Navy is three years , 
not fifteen. t Even a succession of five ite rations of the worst pre dictor Oine A, 
* They would more appropriately be called "presemists," because they are extending the line tangem to the 
present into the future. Some critics cynically discoum the value of what futurists do. H owever, it is far better 
to look ahead, try to form some vision offuture conditions, and be ready to adjust quickly to new realities than 
to divert one's glance from the future and focus myopically on the present. O ne 's vision of the future can be 
refined or re vised in response to change. The p rocess of anticip ation and revision is ceaseless, and any good 
watch stander knows and practices it. 
t A notion preposterous to minds still comfortably anchored on the matu re p orti on of the industrialization 
learning curve. 
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the flat line projection) , incorporating corrections every three years , gives at 
x+1 5 a result better than that of the best (q of the lines in Figure 5 ,  proj ected 
over the fifteen-year period as a whole (see Figure 6) . 
t 
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The moral of this story is that the Navy's crystal balls , carefully polished over 
many decades and carefully tuned to the old S-c urve, are full of fog in the new 
era. The Navy cannot see far en ough down the road it is now taking. The rate of 
change is outstripping the Navy's ability to illuminate the way. That is why the 
Navy-indeed, any organization-that wishes to survive and prosper in the fu­
ture must give p rimary emphasis to developing quickness. 
Survival of the fittest is survival of the fleetest. 
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Integrating New Technology into the Fleet 
There are three major parts in the pro cess o f  integrating new technology into 
the fleet :  
• Research a nd development.  Identifies promising technologies and develops 
applications of them to naval warfare. 
• Contracting, acquisition, and installation .  (For the purposes of this discussion, 
includes associated logistics, maintenance, and maintenance-related 
training) . Produces the developed and tested applications and sees that 
they are properly installed and supported in the fleet .  
• Tactical integration of the new application into naval warfare. 
This process is too slow to accommodate rapidly evolving technologies . I t takes 
years where it should take months (e. g. , the "accelerated" Cooperative Engage­
ment Capability was  conceptualized over ten years ago, and it i s  just now being in­
tegrated tactically) . I t  takes decades where it should take years (e .g . , i t took twenty 
years to move Aegis into the fleet, and then a few more years for the fleet to un­
derstand how to use that system at its full capacity) . 
Much mighty labor and many long hours are required to make the process 
move faster for exceptional projects-drawing effort from the routine projects, 
which then slow even more. Not surprisingly, many people ardently seek to estab­
lish their own projects as "exceptional" (even those that are really routine) , in or­
der to make some progress. Result: the whole process clogs and slows down.  
Fingers point, people shout,  and everyone works harder, but all are unable to make 
the process work as well as they know it must-today, but especially tomorrow. 
Who is at fault? No one. The system is at fault. It was a great system, painfully de­
veloped through much hard work by skilled and dedicated pe ople. However, it is 
now an analog, series-connected, highly ordered system in a digital ,  parallel­
connected, disorderly world . The Navy pays high salaries to some people to main­
tain the system, to others to make it work, and to still others to subvert it. What the 
Navy really needs to do is fix it . 
Focus on Time 
A s  discussed previously, data" is  the lever needed t o  move the Navy from the 
Industrial Age to the trans-indus trial age, from the mature section of the old 
learning curve to the young section of the new learning curve. The trans­
industrial system, whi ch is based on rapidly applying rapidly developing new 
.. Again, not merely questionable numbers, gathered as needed to decorate p oliti cal arguments, but  credible , 
accurate , and meaningful measurements related to issues of current import. Of course , data is a necessary but  
insufficient tool :  it must  be used in conj unction with the fulcrum of mission-essential tasks and the wisdom to 
use the data effectively. 
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technologies, is focused on effectiveness and speed ("cycle time") of develop­
ment and application. At the same time , institutions of the old, industrial system 
find themselves in economic trouble and the refore pay increasing attention to 
efficiency as budgetary stresses and strains become intole rable . 
By addressing the growing need for efficiency, the Navy thus has an excellent 
opportunity, now, to move itself into the trans-industrial age . To make its case in 
these times of eve r greate r budge t stress ,  the Navy has to ove rcome political ar­
guments (rooted in the old system) with data-based arguments. "X marks the 
spot" at which data-based arguments will be more effec tive than political argu­
ments , and the Navy is near (or past) that spot (see Figure 7) . 
Figure 7 
p�uments 
Budget Stress ----I .. � 
The trouble is tha t the Navy cannot use data-based arguments unless it has 
data , something which it sorely needs .  To marshal its arguments, the Navy must 
emphasize time as the scarce resou rce and gather data on where time is being in­
vested. Think on the following. 
As the world moves into the trans-industrial age, time is becoming an ex­
tremely scarce and precious resource .  But j ust a little careful observation reveals 
the fact that time is seldom thought of that way. It is  poorly accounted for, and it 
is assumed to be always available. Almost no one has more of it  than anyone else 
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does ,  and it is very difficult to buy more. Indeed, it is the one irreplaceable re­
source ,  especially in combat. 
The proverb rings true :  ti me is money-lots of money. Today's largest mone­
tary exp enses are in wages and salary. For example, fewer workers are required on 
shop floors; however, more (and b etter-paid) workers are required in the soft­
ware and support activities that reduce the need for shop-floor workers , while 
imp roving the quality of shop output. As demand for "knowledge workers " in­
creases,  they become more expensive , and their time becomes more valuable. 
The same considerations, with minor changes of de tail , hold true for the De­
partment of Defense and for the Navy. 
Efficiency, then,  is absolutely critic al .  In general terms, efficiency means ob­
taining more useful output for a unit of input.  In more sp ecific terms relevant to 
the present era , efficiency means getting more useful output  (increasingly 
thought of in terms of useful knowledge) fro m each unit of time which has been 
p urc hased from expe rt knowledge workers . 
Thus the quantity " time" is a scarce resource in two ways:  
• Accelerating rates of technological development drastically redu ce cycle 
time (elapsed clock and calendar time) , making it mu ch more critical .  
• The time of the knowledge worker is expensive. Scarce money means 
scarce time.  
Although time is money, in the trans-industrial age time is increasingly a re­
source more critical than money. M oney is becoming a mere abstraction fo r 
time, so that giving up time to save money is not mu ch more than making a bad 
bargain.  For the Navy, be coming quicker (while keeping " qu ality" at least at 
current levels) means getting more for its money. 
More what? More output-more useful output, that is . Output is useful if it  
helps the Navy to reach its  objectives and to execute its  missions.  If not useful,  
the output is at best irrelevant, at wo rst harmful. 
Mission Accomplishment 
To review: the task at  hand is to lever  the Navy fro m  the Industrial Age to 
the trans-industrial age, using data-based arguments to increase the efficiency 
and quickness with which it accomplishes its missions.  The task involves seven 
* 
steps .  
* Although t h e  following discussion refe� t o  t h e  highest command levels , i t  should b e  noted that these 
seven steps can be done at all command levels, w ith appropriate adaptations. 
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1 .  State the miss ions and objectives <if the Navy. This is a necessary action, but 
not a sufficient one.  That is :  it is vital to state the mission,  but i t  is likewise vital to 
plan the execution of the mission .
* 
2 .  Reexamine the missions <if the Navy and restate them in operational terms . 
This involves defining how the Navy would go about executing its missions and 
achieving its objectives .  No matter how the missions are restated, it is necessary 
that the operational statements include time standards. For example, suppose the 
missio n is "take Lillipu tian Island by 1 5  June " ;  the plan of action is the campaign 
plan (time-phased actions and support) . If the mission canno t  be sta ted with 
such precision,  it can be stated in more general terms;  e .g. , " take a defended 
mountainous island in the Sea of Lopez within six weeks of initial action ." The 
campaign plan can likewise be expressed in general terms . 
3 .  Develop detailed process flow charts Jor each mission and Jor each task oj each mis­
sion . Again ,  time standards are essential and must be specified for the comple tion 
of every task on the charts .t 
4. Determine the probability that each task will be do ne as planned. To calculate a 
number reflecting the probabili ty+ that an obj ective or mission will be acc om­
plishe d  to a specified standard within a specified period, each detailed flow chart 
must be set up as a probabili ties equation. For each step (task) in the equation ,  
the probability o f  achieving the standard for that step, within t h e  time allowed, 
must be determined. Time data relevant to a step can come from historical rec­
ords , direct  observation, automatic measurement, expert estimates, simulations , 
or models. The only requirement is that the time data be as accu rate as possi­
ble-the quality of the data can be continually refined. The important thing is to 
get started. 
5. Improve the likelihood that every process will achieve its objective within the 
required time standards. Experts who fully understand a process or sub-process 
* Some years ago ,  many organizations spent a great deal of effort on the idea of "vision"-namely, the 
vision of an organization, and how that vision is to be define d. This was an e xp ression of the intuitively (but 
dimly) perceived need to base effort and expenditures on missions and objectives. The discussions associated 
with developing vision statements were usually quite accurate and i nspired. However, most of the resulting 
vision statements were flawed: the problem was that they were not ope rational . They used impressive words 
and were posted in elegant formats , but the vision statements had little re al  impact because they had no 
operational plans of action and milestones for accomplishing whatever missions were envisioned. 
t In the mid- 1 990s there was considerable interest in "process mapping" as a step in "B usiness Process 
Reengineering. " And even before reengineering came into vogue,  flow-charting was one of the maj o r  tools 
of Total Quality Management. Both p rocess mapping and flow-c harting were central to efforts made at 
gaining real knowledge of the p rocesses by which a mission or objective is accomplished. The goal was 
admirable,  the tools excellent, but  the efforts generally failed. The problem was misapplication (actually, 
incomplete application) of the tools: process mapping and flow-charting were usually not integrated into a 
plan of action related to an operational statement of the missi on. 
+ The calculated number will not exp ress the actual probability. It will, h owever, reflect the probability; 
thus, increasing the calculated number will in fact also increase the actual probability. 
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examine it closely and imp rove it. Those who are experts * at each step (or sub­
process) in a process examine that step to see if it can be acco mplished quicker, 
cheaper, and/ or easier, while at least maintaining quality at current levels . 
6. Use time as a key measure of readiness. Specifically, use steps 4 and 5 to im­
prove the probabili ty of timely execution of each task and to improve continu­
ally the readiness of a unit to execute each task quickly. 
In view of the paramount importance of time, it is wise to measure readiness in 
terms of time. In any dynamic, de­
veloping environment-especially 
in a combat environment--speed 
and quickness have an impact and 
quality all their own. For a Navy 
unit, readiness consists not only in 
being able simply to meet a stan­
In small operations, as in large, speed is the 
essential element oj success. 
-General Geo rge S. Patton,Jr. 
Speed is the essence oj war. 
-Sun Tzu 
dard, but also in being able to meet it as quickly as possible. In fact, the speed with 
which a standard is met can be more critical than the degree to which it is met. 
Each task in the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) is either already measured 
in terms of time or can be measured in terms of time. Time measures are rela­
tively easy to establish and understand. They can be highly accurate and credible, 
and are clearly meaningful to both combat operations and support . 
7 .  Conduct an inves tment analysis to determine where the Navy should put its ef­
fort and money to improve the probable 1fectiveness and the efficiency of each process. To 
improve everything in a process at one time is usually imp ractical and unafford­
able as well as unwise. Thus, for the improvement of a given p rocess, the key is to 
find the best place to put money and effort. A sensitivity analysis on the prob­
abilities equation associated with a process does j ust that: it identifies the terms 
that have the greatest impact on the result of the process.  After it is determined 
how much must be invested in each step to have the same degree of impact on 
the result , the money and effort are spent where they will have the most impact. 
Support 
A focus on time is also crucial in the management of all supporting activities,  
including purely administrative tasks .  The steps to realize gains in efficiency are 
simple-but likely difficult, initiall/-and are greatly facilitated by available 
methods of data collection, p rocessing, and analysis .  
• The experts are most often those who do the proc ess. 
t Initially difficult, bec ause different. In organizations a different task is initially a difficult task, no matter 
how simple it really is . 
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First, each support organization must institutionalize a method that continuously 
records and analyzes man-hour expenditures by individual, Junction, product or service, 
and customer or objective. Ceaselessly monitoring the trend lines in every process 
will flag problems ; track costs ;  assist planning; and provide fresh, meaningful 
information necessary for improving efficiency. 
Then support staffs must lead and manage to reduce time costs constantly. The 
Navy's competitors are always improving; new applications of technology pose 
new challenges;  and c ompetitive cycle times are inexorably shrinking. Incessant 
change brings with it an unending train of challenges and opportunities , neces­
sitating continuous improvement in the Navy's deliverables,  as well as steady re­
duction of its costs . Process analysis to improve qJidency must be a continuous �ort, 
not a one-shot ciffair. 
There is no single recipe for im­
plementing a focus on time. All 
Navy leaders can develop work­
able , data-based methods for their 
own organizations. Whatever the 
specific method, the important 
§§§ 
A good solution applied with vigor now is 
better than a perfect solution ten minutes 
later. 
-General George S.  Patton, Jr. 
thing is to Jocus on time in every command, department, division,  work center, 
and office .  The time to begin is Now. The techniques that are devised can be re­
fined or redesigned with experience. 
Refine the Requirements Process 
Problems 
The requirements process today barely works ; it stumbles along, hobbled by 
many problems. First, there is inadequate vision on which to base the definition 
of warfare requirements . The Navy needs better answers to the following ques­
tions :  
• What i s  i t  that the  Navy may be expected to  do? 
• H ow quickly will the Navy have to do it? 
• How much is the country willing to pay-in the warfare currencies of 
casualties,  time, and destroyed equipment-to do i t? 
• What is the plan for accomplishing the tasks? 
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Compounding the problem of inadequate vision is the fact that requirements 
are program-driven instead of mission-driven; service-driven instead of j oint­
driven;  and, within the service, community-driven instead of service-driven.  
Requirements inputs are focused on specific procurement programs and warfare 
communities within th e services. Usually, the question that is actually addressed, 
albeit implicidy, is "What do we want ,  and how can we j ustify i t  by relating it to 
j oint warfare?"  
Related to  this i s  the worrisome fact that inputs are political rather than 
data-based. There appears to be little data support , related to warfare , for 
statements that this or that system (or number of systems) is or is not "critic al " ;  
"required" ; "essential" ; " ce ntral " ;  " needed" ; " adequate" ;  " ready " ;  " key" ; " fun­
damental" ; "sufficient" ;  " efficient";  "robust" ;  "vital" ; " minimum" ; etc.-so goes 
the lexicon. Professional opinion is no substitute for data (particularly when profes­
sional opinions differ) . 
As to the definition of warfare requirements, component commanders are 
currendy playing the wrong game. Component commanders naturally have a 
service focus, with close ties to service budge ting structures in the Pentagon.  
Thus they tend to concentrate on Pentagon currencies (programs , dollars) rather 
than warfare currencies (casualties,  time, capital equipment, logistics ,  collateral 
damage) . 
To top the list ,  the entire process for defining and filling warfare requirements 
is much too slow for an era of rapid change. This problem is not addressed further 
in this Newport Paper, although it is ultimately th e military's-not just the 
Navy's-most serious "warfare deficiency." The solution is well outside a fleet 
commander's fence lines. Some program managers are alert to this deficiency 
and are trying to do something about it .  Given the " rules of the game," they can 
do only a litde at a time. However, it is unlikely that incremental changes will be 
enough. Correction of this problem is an entirely separate ball game. 
So from what source can the solutions come? 
Not the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Th ey do not have 
knowledge of mission-oriented warfare requirements . Moreover, they are too 
political, tainted with "inside-the-Beltway" concerns. 
Not the Services.  They do not have knowledge of mission-oriented j oint 
warfare requirements. They may talk j oint,  but they seldom understand it or 
know how to begin to understand it. There is little interaction among compo­
nent services on requirements issues.  Within the Services,  the perspective of 
each warfare community tends to be skewed by allegiances to favored programs . 
Lastly, they also are too politically interested. 
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Not Congress . The primary ties of members of C ongress are to their voting 
co nstituencies . Most senators and representatives lack expertise in defense mat­
ters , and they have a completely political bias , by design . Even their hired experts 
are politically s kewed (else they would not have been hired) . Nevertheless , many 
members of Congress are aware of the military's problems . 
O nly the combatant CINCs can solve the requirements problem. Only they 
have direct access to the warfare experts who have to execute the missions in the 
field. Only they and their subordinate JFCs are truly j oint .  Only they and their 
subordinate JFCs are the genuine warfighters . O nly the combatant  CINCs stand 
a chance of being regarded as " honest brokers "  in Pentagon politics .  
Solutions 
To define warfare requirements and fill them, the warflghters mus t focus on 
the objectives they may be expected to achieve, as well as the associated strategy, 
campaign, missions, ta ctics, and tasks . These objectives should not be limited to, 
or even focus on ,  exis ting war plans. The warfighters must also think in terms of 
warfare currencies : time, casualties , capital equipment, logis tics, and collateral 
damage. 
The Services and Department of Defense must convert the CINCs' warfare 
requirements into resource requirements. They must also convert the warfare 
currencies and resource requirements into dollar equivalents for budget pur­
poses, then prioritize and reques t the resources from Congress.  The Services 
subsequently convert the provided resources into ready warfare capabilities 
through research and development,  procurement, manning, maintenance, and 
training. 
How to Make the Solu tions Happen 
The combatant CINCs must pursue two courses of action simultaneously. 
One pertains to the definition of warfighting requirements and the other to 
combat support requirements.  Each course of action consists of several tasks . 
Warfighting Requirements 
1 .  S tate the set of s trategic objec tives the unified command will prepare to 
achieve. 
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2. Specify the campaigns the warfighters should prepare to execute in pur­
suit of the strategic objectives .  If political sensitivi ties militate against specificity, 
then formulate eac h campaign generically. 
3 .  For each campaign, specify the nature and size of the threats to be over­
come and the assets to be assigned. Wherever possible, state the maximum allow­
able costs in warfare currencies. 
4. Specify j oint force commanders and subordinate component command­
ers for each campaign. It is desirable but it may not be possible to identify the J FC 
and component commanders who will actually be assigned the campaign . How­
ever, each candidate JFC and component commander should be involved in 
planning at least one campaign. 
5 .  Task each JFC to work with associated component commanders and de­
velop a set of plans for each campaign. Each campaign plan should have an asso­
ciated set of plausible alternatives.  The campaign plans must be prioritized by 
specific criteria, such as probability of success and costs in warfare currencies . 
"Gut guesses" by the JFC will have to suffice in the beginning, until there are 
games and simulations that are accurate enough to be of some help. 
6 .  Task each JFC, assisted by the component commanders, to define the re-
quirements for successful campaign execution: 
• Today. 
• Today, but at lower costs (again, in warfare currencies) . 
• In the future (CINC defines the time horizon for " the future") . If the 
time horizon is very far into the future, it will be quite difficult for the 
JFCs to do this job, and they will need considerable help from more sen­
ior staffs . The key to building an effective requirements system for an era 
of rapid and radical change is to design it not to look far out into the 
distant future but to adjust quickly to changes in the near future (see the 
latter part of the previous section on the learning curve) . 
• In the future--same future as above-but at lower costs (warfare cur­
rencies) . 
Combat Support Requirements· 
1 .  Task warfighters to specify the combat and combat support tasks , with 
associated time standards, required or expected of each type of unit or group 
vis-a-vis a certain threat .  Much of this job will have been done already in the 
campaign plans . 
• Combat supp ort is primarily a service function and should prob ably con tinue that way . 
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2 .  Task the component commanders to measure unit readiness in each of 
the combat and combat support tasks , and to report their measureme nts to the 
receiving ]FC when the units report for duty. (Current measures  are not ade­
quate to this task and must be redefined.)  
3 .  Support those investments requested by the component commanders 
(these are their combat suppo rt requirements) , j ustified by data-based argu­
ments, that will: 
• Either improve the readiness of units and groups to perform the speci­
fied combat or combat support tasks . . .  
• Or enable units and groups to perfo rm the combat or combat support 
tasks at lower costs (warfare currencies) . 
§§§ 
Each combatant CINC collates both types of requirements, warfighting and 
combat support; prioritizes them; and submits them as the I ntegrated Priority 
List for the CINC's theater. 
How to Start 
Start with the warfighting requirements rather than the combat support re­
quirements. Pick one strategic objective, then pick one campaign (not  currently 
in a war plan) in pursuit of that objec tive. Choose one ]FC and one set  of subor­
dinate component commanders to be in charge of the campaign .  Order them to 
develop o ne campaign plan and to formulate its associated set of warfighting re­
quirements today ; today, but at lower costs ;  in the future ; in the future, but at 
lower costs (see above) . 
Evaluate the process. When satisfied with the process , expand it to the entire 
theater. Once that is done, apply the same rationale and process to the definition 
of combat support requirements. 
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ConcRusion� Haze Gray 
and Underway 
As stated from the outset, this paper has been written to stimulate thinking, 
discussion, and new approaches. It is not meant to be the "last word" on the mat­
ters it presents; its recommendations are not prescriptive. Nonetheless , the issues 
and recommendations treated here should be earnestly and seriously discussed, 
not unquestioningly accepted or summarily rejected. Discussion should focus 
not only on the Navy writ large, but also on the Navy writ small--each work 
center, division, department, and command. What can Sailors do, locally and 
within their areas of responsibility, to find out: 
• What should not be done that is being done? 
• What is not being done that should be done? 
• What is being done and should be done, but should be done better, 
quicker, and cheaper, or by somebody else? 
Furthermore,  what can be done, locally, to find out where time and talent 
are going, and whether they are being wasted or misused, and how to use them 
more efficiently in operations and support? Efforts to answer these questions 
and to implement the answers should and can start now, everywhere in the 
Navy. 
A more important task for every level oj every organization is to define a prioritized lis t 
of its own particular missions and tasks, stated in operational and measurable terms. 
When that has been done, the Navy can then answer the following questions 
and give genuine focus to its efforts, as a whole and in its parts . 
• What are the specific implications of increased uncertainty for each or­
ganization in the Navy, and what is the proper response? 
• Is decentralized command and control the way to go at all levels , in all 
functions? Which levels, which functions? 
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• How and where should the Navy define the standards and training lev­
els necessary to support decentralized command and control, and how 
can the Navy accurately measure progress towards those standards? 
• Is a cruising force the way to go in the Navy-after-next? If not, why 
not? If so, how? 
• Is the proposed reorganization, or a version of it, the way to go ? If not, 
why not? If so, how? 
• What does a primary focus on sea and area control portend for the next 
Navy and the Navy-after-next? What are the practical implications? 
Lo ts of questions,  but Now is the time to act, Now is the time to change. The 
Navy canno t  afford to wait for directions fro m  "on high." Those of us currently 
at the peak of the Navy pyramid are the favorite children of old perspectives .  
Admirals know and understand those perspectives and the associated mecha­
nisms and processes, as they must to e nsure that today's jobs are done. With 
nearly every day scheduled from sunrise to sunset, the Navy's flag officers conse­
quently find little time to develop new perspec tives and new courses of actio n. 
Perhaps it should not be that way, but that is the way it is . It makes no difference: at 
this point there is no way of knowing exactly what the correct new courses will 
be, no matter how brilliant the admirals or the members of their staffs . 
Given the above conditions, what the Navy needs is an interacting and 
chemically reactive soup of diverse ideas in every area of activity within the 
Navy (see Appendix C, p. 85) .  New perspectives and courses will evolve from 
the dynamic interplay and testing of these ideas in an open, decentralized, re­
sponsive, and unconstrained (but gently refereed) forum. 
The Navy needs a better forum fo r ideas . One can be built on the Internet.  
That job should be done now. Who among us will do it? 
The Navy needs a better, quicker, and cheaper testing ground for new ideas. 
One can be built with simulators . That job should be done now (not five years 
from now) . Who among us will do it? 
The crucial thing is not to temporize and search long and hard fo r perfectly 
safe courses to steer, but to get underway now and make for sea. That will take 
courage and the willingness to r isk scraping a few roc ks and shoals . After the 
Navy is on course in the new seas , it will have to take frequent fixes and adjust 
course as necessary. It has the tools for successful sailing, and its history gives it 
reason to sail confidently. And while the Navy and the next Navy are doing all 
that needs to be done in the service of the nation, they must also design and 
build the Navy-after-next--quickly. 
Meanwhile, the clock keeps ticking, faster and faster . . . .  
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Ap pendix A 
F ighti ng Princ ip les 
There are no new principles if war. However, dijferent principles should receive different 
emphases in differen t environments. Some are especially appropriate to the Navy's curren t 
environment. This appendix highlights a few of those principles. 
Fight humans, not just machines. Machines do not ye t think in terms of 
return on investment. Humans do. The less certain humans are of an outcome, 
the less inclined they are to invest effort (or wealth , o r  life,  or time , o r  reputation) 
in its attainment. Uncertainty deters action. Increasing the enemy's uncertainty 
deters enemy action and thus buys more of the most pre cious commodity in 
battle : time. 
But heightening uncertainty does not always work; and when it does not 
work, it is time to take action.  Killing the enemy may be an option, but military 
action that emphasizes killing is not always the most effective measure.  For ex­
ample, martyrs do not fear death , at least not until after they are committed, and 
killing them usually breeds more martyrs .  To be effective, find out what the en­
emy treasures and take it away; or find out what the enemy fears or hates or de­
spises ,  and delive r it generously. The aim is to fight minds and wills .  Defeating 
the enemy's will obviates the need to fight the e nemy's machines. 
Expect surprise! Currently, the United States Navy is the most powerful 
Navy in the world. Any enemy will plan to neutralize its p owe r through surprise. 
To minimize surprise, the Navy s hould plan a variety of attacks against i ts own 
forces.  It is a good exercise for j unior officers and will simultaneously help them 
(and their commanders) to understand the enemy. 
The best way to avoid being surprised by the enemy is  to surprise the enemy 
first. However, the political situation o r  the Rules of Engagement may not allow 
naval forces to do that. The best way to accommodate surprise is to design and 
train the Navy to be flexible and to react quic kly-very, very q uickly, and more 
quickly than any potential enemy. 
Understand the enemy. Understand the enemy's obj ectives ,  treasures,  fears , 
strengths, and weaknesses .  Anticipate the enemy's exploitation of one's own vul­
nerabilities .  Then use this knowledge and understanding to take what is 
The Newport Papers 
treasured; give what is feared; turn the enemy's strength into a liability; attack the 
enemy's weaknesses;  and guard one's own vulnerabilities" 
Use intelligence wisely. Intelligence can be a force multiplier; it can also be 
an Achilles heel. Which one it is depends upon the effectiveness of enemy coun­
terintelligence. Understand that th e enemy will try to deceive sensors or deny 
information to them. Realize and accept that one's having been deceived or de­
nied information re mains unknown until the enemy is "at the gates ." The key 
concern is no t how mu ch intelligence information is in one's possession, but 
how reliable the information is and how many "warfare currencies" should be 
bet on it. 
Counter the enemy's surveillance. Although there are times when the 
enemy should know one's force is present and capable, it is  never desirable that 
the enemy know the exact location of all one's units or one 's precise intentions 
(i . e . ,  one must be unpredictable) . That lack of knowledge engenders uncertainty 
and may cause the enemy to increase surveillance efforts . Observation of the 
enemy's surveillance wilJ reveal something of enemy intentions and capabilities ,  
and those are good t o  know. 
To maintain or even increase enemy uncertainty, the ene my's surveillance sys­
tem must be neutralized. There are five ways to do this: destroy it ;  deceive it; del­
uge it by flooding it with excessive information ;  deny information to it; or 
disconnect it fro m  enemy fighting forces and control centers so that they do not 
receive correct information. 
Counter the enemy's targeting. If one is located by the enemy, one must 
keep fro m  being targeted by enemy weapons.  The same five ways of countering 
surveillance systems apply to countering targeting systems: destroy the weapons 
platform; deceive the sensor; deluge the sensor with excessive data; deny infor­
mation to the sensor; or disconnect the targeting sensor from the control sur­
faces of the weapon.  
Preplan responses. Preplanned responses enable a combat unit to react 
quickly and automatically to tactical conditions and do not require an order 
from a senior commander. Do not confuse "intentions," whic h require imple­
mentation orders , with "preplanned responses ," which do not. 
• Although respect is not necessarily prerequisite to u nderstanding, it is wise to respect the enemy, or at least  
to respect what the enemy can do.  Given its present vantage of military and economic p reeminence , the 
United States is often tempted to arrogance, dangerously blinding itself to its own sho rtcomings and to an 
enemy 's strengths. It is extremely imprudent to assume that the enemy is inferior because o f  fewer numbers. 
less wealth ,  and " strange " culture and appearance. Moreover, American culture is spread throughout the 
w orld, and the United States is often the focus of the international media. I t is therefore likely that enemies of 
the U.S.  understand it better than the U.S.  understa nds its enemies--a situation fraught with danger for U.S.  
armed forces . 
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Use the offense.  The best defe nse is still a good offense.  However, a good of­
fense must overwh elm the critical targets. In quick,  fast-moving warfare, enemy 
decision makers and combat personnel are targets more critical than mere 
equipment and facilities. 
Know the danger curves. Know which systems the enemy can bring to 
bear, their range, and the tactics for their employmen t .  As additional enemy sys­
tems populate the battle space ,  they cause stepped discontinuities in one's danger 
curves. Defensive posture and/or momentum of attack must be increased upon 
entering the envelopes of opposing systems . In trans-industrial warfare,  ' know 
the danger curves '  applies not only to weapons systems but also to enemy infor­
mation systems and enemy manipulation of neutral information systems (e.g. , 
political forums and public media) . 
Use tough, simple, and workable tactics.  Good engineering simplifies 
operation. Similarly, good tactics simplify combat. Like good engineering, how­
ever, good tactical design is rare. Good tactics : 
• Are robust . They weather surprises and disappointment well.  
• Are simple, very simple-indeed, extremely simple.  They are easily 
learned and remembered. 
• Rely on minimal, simple, tough,  and fail-safe command, c ontrol , and 
communications.  
• Are not predictable by the enemy. 
• Do not kill friends . 
Simplify, clarify, and shorten tactical instruction s .  Complex tactical in­
structions are seldom read carefully, if they are read at all . If read,  they are seldom 
understood in the same way by all. If understood, they are seldom remembered 
in detail . If not carefully read, commonly u nderstood, and accurately remem­
bered, there is insufficient time in battle to review or clarify them. And then it is 
far too late. 
Mind the arithmetic. Make sure there is enough materiel to support the tac­
tics. Know the detection horizons and limitations---one's own and the enemy's. 
Minimize the detection and engagement holes, or at least make them unpredictable. 
Avoid the worst of all emissions control errors .  The worst emissio ns 
control error is to come out of the restricted emission condition too late. 
Define the timeline s .  
• One 's own timeline: make i t  shorter than expected t o  effect surprise and 
to deny the enemy both battle space and time. 
• The enemy timeline: lengthen it by all possible means to increase the bat­
tle space and time available to one's own forces .  I n  trans-industrial war­
fare, increasing the enemy's uncertainty does this best .  
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Obvious, But Frequently Neglected Principles 
Know and understand one's capabilities.  
Understand the tactics and execute them properly. 
Know what one is talking about and how one will be understood. 
One's own capabilities ,  tactics, and clarity of communication cannot be ade­
quately known unless tested under real stress. 
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Tactical Development 
Tactics are methods for using weapons to achieve a military objective. If opti­
mized, those methods are force multipliers that are within the Navy's control; are 
cheap to develop; and do not chafe the political concerns of Congress or indus­
try. 
To be effective, however, tactics must be developed in a timely manner. The 
current time-line for tactical development and evaluation is too long in a chang­
ing world. It  frequently takes over three years from the statement of the need for 
a battle group tactic to the completed evaluation of a candidate tactic.  Then 
there are usually another few years to the inclusion of the tactic in a Naval War­
fare Publication.  
Timeliness is  not the only concern . Tactics must be appropriate, executable, 
and robust. Yet many of the tactics resulting from current processes do not mee[ 
those criteria .  As a consequence, some are not held in high regard and, in some 
cases , are entirely ignored. 
The Navy would therefore be wise to reform, quicken,  and improve its pro­
cesses for developing tactics. By taking the time now--during this world "re­
cess"-to perfect the ability to develop tactics quickly, the Navy will enable itself 
to respond more agilely and effectively to the unknown dangers that will inevi­
tably come its way in the future. 
Although the Navy may today have enough p ower to counter any cur­
rent e nemies with current tacti c s ,  a focus  on tactical development will en ­
able i t  to accompli sh  i t s  missions at  lower costs i n  ti me,  casualties , operating 
funds ,  and c apital i nvestment-and more i mpressively and more thor­
oughly beside s .  Simple and effe ctive tac tics  will also facili tate faster and 
c heaper trai ning,  and reduce dependence o n  co mmand and control .  By de­
veloping a quic k  and efficient  process  for developin g  tac ti c s ,  the Navy will 
be able to respond more promptly and effectively to tec hnologi c al i nn ova­
tio n s  (foreign and domesti c , fri ends'  and foe s ' ) , new enemie s ,  n ew enemy 
tactic s ,  n ew situati o n s ,  and n ew missi o n s  ( including those of pote ntial ene­
mies) . 
Lastly, an emphasis on tactical development will enhance the fighting ability 
and the morale of Navy personnel involved in the process .  
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What Should Be Done 
As things now stand, the responsibilities for tac tical development, evaluation ,  
and training are fragmented among many commands . Although the curre nt sys­
tem works fairly well for unit tactics,  it is ge nerally inadequate for the rapid de­
velopment and evaluation of group (multi-platform) and joint (multi-service) 
tac tics .  The following actions will facilitate quicker and bette r development of 
group and joint tactics .  
1 .  Reconstitute the Naval Doctrine Command as the Fleet Tactics and 
Doctrine Center ;  subordinate it  to CINCLANTFLT (in today's Navy structure) , 
and give it responsibility for overseeing and coordinating all efforts in tactical devel­
opment. Although the development and evaluation of multi-platform and multi­
service tactics are its primary concerns , the Center also oversees the development 
and evaluation of platform tactics by SWDG, SUBDEVRONs, VXs, OPTEVFOR, 
and NSAWC. 
2. Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center establish Tactical Development 
Teams (see below) . 
3 .  Numbered fleet commande rs forward to Fleet Tactics and D octrine 
Center all fleet requirements for tactical development. 
4. Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center direct each request for the develop­
ment of a group and/ or j oint tactic to the appropriate Tactical Development 
Team. 
5 .  Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Cente r respond to all tactical development 
requirements by providing an evaluated tactic to the requesting command in: less 
than a year by 1 January 1 999; less than six months by 1 January 2000; less than 
three months by 1 January 200 1 ;  and mo re quickly thereafter. These timelines 
will necessitate the use of computer simulations. 
6. Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center distribute tactics and updates elec­
tro nically, keeping electronic tactical publications within 3 ,500 words (not in­
cluding graphs , tables ,  and illustrations) . 
7 .  Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center use uniformed personnel and civil 
servants , and representatives from the Center for Naval Analyses and non­
competing universi ty laboratories, to evaluate tactics .  
8 .  Move (eventually) the Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center and all tactical 
development and evaluation effo rt to the functional commander fo r Fleet 
Training and D octrine Command subordinate to COMNAVUSA. 
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Tactical Development Teams 
Each Tactical Development Team is composed mostly of uniformed per­
sonnel. They are the ones who bleed, and so have a vested interest in quality 
tactics . It is also good training for them to think about tactics ,  and it enhances 
their professional development. Finally, uniformed personnel generally like to 
think about tactics, but currently have little opportunity or  encouragement to 
do so. * 
The Fleet Tactics and Doctrine Center identifies a cadre of uniformed tacti­
cal specialists and ensures that their expertise is recognized and put to use in the 
development of tactics .  This requires procedures to: 
• Identify uniformed tactical experts in various warfare areas , wherever 
they are in the Navy 
• Organize them into Tactical Development Teams 
• Link them together in an electronic network 
• Enable these dispersed but electronically netted tactical experts to work 
together as teams 
Evaluation 
Professional analysts and evaluators are to evaluate (not develop) tactics. There 
are professionals within the Navy establishment (Warfare Centers , Center for 
Naval Analyses,  and university labs contracted to the Navy) that can help in the 
evaluation of tactics ,  although that is not within their present tasking. 
Use of Contractors 
Tactics should not be developed by contractors. Contractors , despite being 
professional and dedicated, are more expensive than uniformed personnel and 
tend to be less up-to-date on naval operations and tactical requirements .  Moreo­
ver, contractors do not have to put developed tactics into practice .  
Contracting and review procedures, and the defacto requirement for contrac­
tors to think in terms of deliverable products, staffing considerations, and busi­
ness considerations, slow the tactical development and evaluation process. If 
necessary, contractors can be used for administration, formatting, and publishing 
* And that is the Navy's fault, not theirs. 
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of tac tical documents (although this too can probably be done within the Navy 
establishme nt) . 
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Complexity Theory 
This is a much abbreviated discussion of some aspects of complexity theory 
and how those aspects of the theory apply to what the Navy must do between 
now and the Navy-after-next. I ts contents are gleaned from or inspired by the 
writings of M. Mitchell Waldrop and Stuart Kauffman. 6 
Order, Chaos, and Complexity 
Systems can exhibit two extremes of structure:  order and chaos. An excep­
tionally ordered system has litde interaction among its elements. There is litde 
flexibility within it. It  does what its structure allows , and no more.  It does not in­
teract constructively with new systems, and therefore it  neither learns nor 
evolves.  I t tends to be rigid. It  is Stalinist. 
A chaotic system has the opposite problem. It has few standards. It lacks the 
minimum levels of stability that are needed to maintain and nurture a learning 
system. I t  constandy reacts and seldom integrates. I ts lack of structure allows eve­
rything, and therefore nothing evolves beyond its current state. It tends to be ut­
terly fluid and turbulent. It is Bosnian. 
In between these two extremes,  at a kind of murky, turbid phase transition 
called " the edge of chaos," there is complexity. In this phase transition the ele­
ments of the system never quite lock into place, yet never quite dissolve into tur­
bulence, either. This system is both stable enough to store information and active 
enough to transmit it. It is American. 7 
Complex systems on the edge of chaos can self-organize to react to their en­
vironment.  To attain the levels of spontaneity and adaptation necessary for self­
organization, they must be highly interactive with other related systems (no 
stovepipes allowed) , and very quick to absorb, integrate, and change. The United 
States has developed such a system to manage its society; the Navy has developed 
such a system to manage an active flight deck (see pages 22-25) . It  is the Navy's 
task to develop a similarly flat, adaptive, and agile system to manage a successful 
(which means,  rapidly evolving) Navy in the edge-of-chaos situation it faces in 
the trans-industrial world. 
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Coevolution 
Found in the region between order and chaos, coevolution is a process in 
which two or more related processes support each other in ways that cannot be 
foreseen before they begin to interact .  It  is somewhat different from random se­
lection and survival of the fittest . 
For example,  the invention of the internal combustion engine led to the inven­
tion of the automobile, which began life as a rich gentleman's toy. 8 Development 
of the automobile led to development of gas stations, better roads , motels , etc . , 
which in turn encouraged more people to buy automobiles.  The growing 
population of owners and operators of automobiles began to live farther from 
work, meet people in distant towns, and distribute products more rapidly and ef­
ficiently. Tire and rubber industries expanded, and petroleum by-products fed 
the development of the chemical industries.  Better steels and metals were devel­
oped, engineering skills were honed and polished, and all was done quicker, 
cheap er, and better than was possible a few years earlier. 
Demand fed competition . Competition fueled the growth of the skills and re­
sources that were applied to further develop ment of the internal combustion en­
gine, constantly improving it. This process unleashed an avalanche of applications ,  
which in turn accelerated the rate of development of the engine and of the related 
industries it spawned. New applications spawned whole new industries in turn. 
Each development fed the others in ways totally unimaginable to the inventors 
and early p roducers of the internal combustion engine and the automobile. 
Simultaneously, the internal combustion engine and the au tomobile pushed 
the horse out of its central position in society. The new drove out the old. Out 
went blacksmiths , saddle makers, stables, carriages, and harness shops . In a rever­
sal of the former order, the horse became the gentleman's toy and the car be­
came a family and social necessity. 
§§§ 
As with the inte rnal combustion engine and the automobile, so too with the 
Navy and its environment. No one knows, and no one can know, what Navy 
will be needed in the foggy distant future.  What is apparent is that the nation 
must have a Navy that will rapidly interact-coevolve--with its changing envi­
ronment. To build a Navy that thrives at the edge of chaos , some of the charac­
teristics of complexity must first be considered: 
• Of course, this paragraph also applies to the Department of Defense, to the other Arme d Services 
separately, and to all the Anned Services jointly. 
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Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a fact of existence in the complex region between order and 
chaos. However, it is not the paralyzing uncertainty of chaos .  As illustrated by the 
coevolution of the internal combustion engine and the auto mobile, new ena­
bli ng ideas grow from new or freshly fertilized fields , and lead to other com­
pletely unexpected ideas in an avalanche of change that no thing can escape. 
The Navy is now swept up in the avalanche of change tha t  was i nitiated, at 
some unheralded and quiet moment, by the development of silic on chips and 
the computer. The implications of new tec hnologies and rapid change are pro­
found and enge nder uncertainties that cause severe disquiet and unease. The 
Navy is tempted to cling to the security blanket of its successful past, but that sort 
of cringing-however comforting-will not take it safely through the future, 
which is arriving now. 
It  is up to the Navy to learn ,  now, how to ride the avalanc he of change. It  must 
continually and quickly adapt. The consequences of the actions it takes,  and 
whether they will succeed, cannot be known. Nonetheless,  it is plain that a fixa­
tion on the past will not help the Navy. It is a fact that if the Navy does not act, it  
will not succeed. 
What actions will help the Navy succeed? In an avalanche of rapid change , 
crystal balls looking far into the future are inevitably cloudy. Thus the best the 
Navy can do is be "locally wise," observing simple decision rules ,  and gathering 
(and digesting) relevant information to help execute its decisions wisely. 9 
The Elements of Success 
Simple Decision Rules,  Locally Applied 
or, 
What the Navy Can Learn from "Boids" 
Birds are not very intelligent animals ; they can resp ond to only the simplest of 
rules .  Nevertheless,  birds flock, and as a flock they move elegantly and smoothly 
in complex environments . If the directions for floc king, and for moving as a 
flock, were transmitted from the leader to each of the members , the leader and 
the members of the flock would require an elab orate communications system 
and considerable processing power. But birds have neither. How do they do it? 
In the late 1 980s,  a gentleman by the name of Craig Reynolds developed a 
computer flock of "boids." His flock "flew" beautifully, but it was not built and 
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led by a leader from the top down. Rather, it was built from the bottom up, in a 
scheme in which each boid followed three simple rules of behavior, described by 
1 0  Waldrop as follows: 
1 .  Maintain a minimum distance from other obj ects in the environment, 
including other boids . 
2 .  Match velocities with nearby boids .  
3.  Move toward the perceived center o f  mass o f  the group o f  nearby boids.  
N one of the rules was "form a floc k," which would have been too hard for a 
bird/boid to execu te. The rules were entirely local, referring only to what a boid 
could see and do in its own vicinity. The flock formed "from the bottom up." 
The boids were able to fly as a flock in a complex environment (from a boid's 
perspective) through: 
• Simple decision rules 
• Locally available information 
The same formula works for more intelligent entities in much more complex 
environments, even those that threaten to overwhelm their inhabitants. By apply­
ing simple decision rules on the basis of information made available to it, the Navy 
can flourish in the complexity of its environment while continuing to learn and 
adapt. 
Diversity 
The more ideas the Navy has available to it, the more interaction,  stimulation, 
and coevolution is possible. The more structure the Navy has, the fewer the ideas 
the Navy gets . An intricate system of stovepipes and bureaucracies (such as the 
present structure of the Navy) tends to quash ideas and stifle creative thought. 
Too much structure leads to a highly ordered regime that tends also to be slower, 
less agile, and less flexible than a less ordered regime. 
To open the flo odgates that are holding back ideas, the Navy must: 
• Reduce its struc ture 
• Flatten its structure 
• Minimize individual risk 
• Reward ideas 
Reactivity 
I deas that do not interact cannot coevolve. For coevolution to occur, 
diversity of ideas must be catalyzed by communication (diversity wi thout 
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communicatio n among vario us eleme nts is merely divisive and co unterproduc­
tive) . Modern te chnology fosters extensive and pervasive communication and 
thus makes possible flat organizations that depend upon and encourage such 
communi cation . 
A high degree of reactivity-the rate and intensity of interactio n between the 
various components of a mixture (any mixture, whether chemical, biological, or 
social)-must be sustained in the soup of diversi ty long enough to establish a 
co urse of development. The greater the reactivi ty, the shorter the time needed 
for interaction to evolve a new course (i . e. ,  more options can be explored in less 
time) . 
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3M 
ACU 
C41 
CB 
CENTCOM 
CINC 
CINCLANTFLT 
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· 
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CJCS 
COMNAVAIRFOR
· 
COMNAVSUBFOR
· 
COMNAVSVRFOR
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COMSOLANT 
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CV 
CVN 
EOD 
EUCOM 
FISC 
FMB 
FTSC 
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Append ix D 
Acronyms 
Ships' Maintenance and Material Management 
Assault Craft Unit 
Command, Control , Communications ,  Computers , 
and Intelligence 
Naval Construction Battalion 
United States Central Command 
Commander-in-Chief. In this document, the term 
evolves solely to denote a combatant commander­
in-chief. 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, next Navy 
Co mmander-in-Chief, Pacific Fle et 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S .  Pacific Fleet, next Navy 
Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces Europe 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Commander, Naval Air Force 
Commander, Submarine Force 
Commander, Naval Surface Force 
Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific 
Commander, Naval Forces in the United S tates 
Commander, South Atlantic Force 
Continental Uni ted States 
aircraft carrier 
aircraft carrier, nuclear power 
explosive ordnance disposal 
United States European Command 
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 
Financial Management Budget 
Fleet Technical Support Center 
Joint Force Commander 
local area network 
Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 
• Term pertains to notional organizations described in this pamphlet. 
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MOOTW 
MPA 
MSTS 
N8 
NAVD OC 
NCA 
NFC 
NSAP 
NSAWC 
NWAD Corona 
OPNAV 
OPTEVFOR 
PACOM 
SEAL team 
SOUTHCOM 
STRATCOM 
SUBDEVRON 
SWDG 
UAV 
UNTL 
USACOM 
VX 
WAN 
WMD 
military operations other than war 
maritime patrol aircraft 
Military Sea Transportation Service (formerly MSC) 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources,  
Warfare Requirements , and Assessment 
Naval Doctrine Command 
National Command Authorities 
Numbered Fleet Commander 
Navy Science Assistance Program 
Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 
Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, Calif or­
ma 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
Operational Test and Evaluation Forces 
United States Pacific Command 
sea-air-land team; a naval force specially organized, 
trained, and equipped to conduct special operations 
in maritime, littoral , and riverine environments. 
United States Southern Command 
Strategic Command 
Submarine Development Squadron 
Surface Warfare Development Group 
unmanned aerial vehicle 
Universal Naval Task List 
United States Atlantic Command 
Navy Air Development Squadron; Air Test and Eval­
uation Squadron 
wide-area nerwork 
weapon(s) of mass destruction 
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